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ABSTRACT

Seven papers presented at a conference for philosophy of education specialists are documented here. These are: (1) "Teacher Directed Study" (J. Popp); (2) "Ageism and the Youth Cult: Educational Dilemma" (G. Lesnoff-Caravaglia); (3) "A Philosophical Analysis of Richard H. Brown's Pursuit of Genuine Questions in History" (C. E. Samac); (4) "Freedom Education-Towards an Educational Synthesis of Dewey's and Sartre's Philosophy of Freedom" (A. Makedon); (5) "The Renewal of Democratic Education: The Need for Disinterested Criticism" (G. L. Gutek); (6) "John Lancaster Spalding: Idealist or Pragmatist?" (R. N. Barger); and (7) "Abstractions in Progressive Thought" (P. L. Smith). The document concludes with business meeting minutes, a treasurer's report, and the society's membership list. (KM)

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE
MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY
1977

Edited

by

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St. Mary's College

and

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of Education Society, please contact Professor Kizer.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

An affiliate of The Philosophy of Education Society, the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society has held an annual conference for almost 20 years. The decision was made at the 1977 conference to publish a proceedings. This volume is the first of what is expected to be an annual event.

Publishing a proceedings is no easy task, especially the first time around. Required are devotion and support from many people. I wish to acknowledge the contributions made by the several members of the Society who were involved in the process, and by the institutions which generously offered financial help.

Frederick C. Neff edited the original papers. Robert Craig, aided by his wife, Carol, proofread the manuscript. Craig and Ronald Swartz investigated printing possibilities. The cover was designed by Nathaniel Champlin. Laszlo Hetenyi, James Merritt, and Jerome Popp were instrumental in obtaining financial support.

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On behalf of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society, my deep appreciation.

Arthur Brown, President

ANNUAL CONFERENCE
MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

November 11 - 12, 1977

Holiday Inn Chicago Downtown
One Mid-City Plaza
Madison at Kennedy
Chicago, Illinois 60606

SPONSOR: University of Illinois, Chicago Circle

LOCATION: Monroe Room, Holiday Inn Chicago Downtown

Friday, November 11, 1977

1:15 Welcome
 Maurice Eash, Acting Dean
 College of Education
 University of Illinois, Chicago Circle

1:30-4:30 First General Session

 Chair: Alan Gorr
 Augustana College

"Teacher Directed Jerome Popp
 Study" Southern Illinois University

"Ageism and the Youth Gari Lesnoff-Caravaglia
 Cult: Educational Sangamon State University &
 Dilemmas" Southern Illinois University

2:50-3:10 Intermission

 Chair: David Angus
 University of Michigan

"A Philosophical Analy- Charles E. Samec
 sis of Richard H. J. Sterling Morton
 Brown's Pursuit of High School
 Genuine Questions in
 History"

"Freedom Education-- Alex Makedon
 Toward an Educational University of Michigan
 Synthesis of Dewey's
 and Sartre's Philos-
 ophies of Freedom"

5:00-6:00 Cocktail Hour

6:15-7:00 Continuation of First General Session

Chair: Joe Burnett
 University of Illinois, Urbana

"The Renewal of
Democratic Education:
The Need for Disinter-
ested Criticism"

Gerald L. Gutek
Loyola University of
Chicago

Saturday, November 12, 1977

9:00-10:30 Second General Session

Chair: Byron Radebaugh
 Northern Illinois University

"John Lancaster:
Idealist or Prag-
matist?"

Robert N. Barger
Eastern Illinois University

"Abstractions in Pro-
gressive Thought"

Philip L. Smith
Ohio State University

10:40-12:00

Business Meeting
Presiding: Arthur Brown
 Wayne State University

12:00

Adjournment

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TEACHER DIRECTED STUDY

Jerome A. Popp
Southern Illinois University

I. Introduction

In a recent analysis of the concept of study, I concluded that to study is to have a disposition to engage in an intentional activity, the actions prescribed by which are believed, by the person studying, to be effective in increasing his knowledge, understanding, or skill. Furthermore, to be effective, a student must be able to make good decisions about how to study; i.e., he must have an adequate methodology of study.¹

Some studying may be done in the absence of a teacher, but it is possible to include a teacher in one's plan for learning, i.e., the methodology of studying with a teacher is a subset of the methodology of studying. In this case the student places himself under the direction of a teacher. The teacher becomes the director (or perhaps co-director) of study.²

In studying, it was observed that "the teacher must inspire as well as instruct," as Horace Mann put it. It is often pointed out to beginning teachers that "motivating the student" is an important part of teaching. But within these general admonitions that teachers should inspire the student there lies a philosophical problem. On what grounds or warrant does one person attempt to get another person to study? Or, in the case of adult-child relationships, is it ever justified to try to "make" a child study?

A large portion of these efforts amounts to forms of social control. I am not saying that on every occasion where one is able to get a child to study we will find a social-control relationship. Structuring the child's environment, e.g., placing books in key places, is a way in which an adult can produce study behavior in the child which may not involve social control.³ What I am claiming is that a large percentage of "inspiring" or "motivating" efforts, especially those in schools, are efforts at social control.

What I am interested in is the set of conditions, if any, under which one person is justified in trying via social control to get another person to study. This question can be posed from either the point of view of the teacher (or parent)

or that of the child. One would expect that an adequate solution from either view would derive from the same basic argument.

II. The Concept of Social Control

In order to come at this problem systematically we require a fairly clear conception of social control. We seek not a repertoire of tricks for social control but a theoretical map of the possibilities of one person's controlling or being controlled by another. This section attempts an analysis of the concept of social control done in such a way that it allows fitting the concept to the problem being considered. I do not claim to be presenting an ordinary language analysis of "social control," or even an analysis of how it functions in sociology; rather, I am trying to fashion a concept which serves the goals of the present inquiry. For one thing, I do not wish to try to deal with the tough problem of the nature of social power. Actually, what I have to say below is an attempt to clarify some points about social power, but such moves are not required for present purposes. Finally, once social control has been characterized, attention will be turned to seeing the teacher-student relationship as a social-control relationship.

A control relationship exists, as Spady put it, "when one party gains compliance from another in an interactional setting."⁴ This approach to defining "social control" makes the term refer to a triadic relation, i.e., x in some interactional situation s . Thus, to describe an instance of control one must specify instances for three variables. The situation, interactional setting, of social context variable, s , is instantiated by the description of a particular social situation. The scope of the y variable, the subject of control, or the controllee, is instantiated by the description of a particular person or group of persons. This interpretation of the y and s variables follows from the assumption that we are considering social control or the control of persons. The x variable is often instantiated by a particular person. We speak of someone's having or being in control; however, the scope of the x variable, the bearer of control, is not always limited to a single person.

A complete definition of "social control" would provide a set of conditions for determining the number and scope of the variables plus a specification of the nature of their relationship. This raises a question about our deliberation thus far: Have we identified all of the variables? From a logical point of view it seems doubtful, for a fourth variable can be detected or isolated resulting in the characterization of social control as a quadratic relation: " x control y with respect to p in situation s " means that x has the ability to get y to comply with prescription (command or directive) p in some context s . This modification actually improves our conception of control relations by rendering it more discriminating. In a given social context one person may be able to

control another person in that he can get the person to comply with many of his wishes. It is very rare, however, to find a situation in which one person can get another person to comply with every directive which might be uttered. The control relationship is delimited by the kind or type of prescription or command being issued. In other words, the specification of the kinds of behaviors x requires of y constitutes a fourth dimension of the control relationship.

The instantiation of this fourth variable in the description of a control relation further refines such descriptions. This could be quite important theoretically; that is, if we attempt to construct explanations for observed social phenomena, which are themselves incompletely specified, then the omitted variables can confound such efforts. Stated differently, we want to make sure that the "why" questions we pose are themselves adequate. But to ignore the prescription variable is to ask inadequate questions, or so it seems. This conclusion requires a restructuring of the triadic concept of social control.

Given this conception of social control, one can distinguish the types of social control possible--four of which are discernible: coercive, contractual, expert, and legal.

In a coercive relationship, y believes that non-compliance with p in s will lead to x's taking some action which will reduce y's benefits. In other words, y believes that x is capable of arranging aspects of the situation in such a way that y cannot achieve or continue to realize what y takes to be of value; moreover, y believes that non-compliance will indeed lead to x's so arranging things. Note that x does not have to be aware of y's beliefs. Social controllers are often unaware that they are in control. Social control emanates from the controlled.

Acts performed because one is fearful of loss of benefit or welfare are not involuntary acts; as Austin used to argue, "voluntarily" is not necessarily contradictory to "involuntarily".⁵ If something is done involuntarily it is not done willingly. People who comply because of coercion may comply willingly. They may not, however, comply voluntarily. They may wish they could do otherwise.

Social control may be manifested in yet other ways. Some compliance is achieved with the wishes of the controllee. In these cases, a social control relationship exists which is different from coercion. People may comply with a directive because of their beliefs that compliance will increase their welfare. This type of social control relationship may be labeled "contractual control" and more formally stated as follows: "x has contractual control over y with respect to p in situation x" means that y believes that x is capable of arranging certain aspects of the world in such a way that y could realize increased benefits, and that y's compliance

with p will result in x's taking (or failing to take) some action the consequences of which will enhance y's benefits. In other words, y sees x as being in an "if you will do this, I will do that" position. Finally, contractual control, like coercion, may be reciprocal.

Note that the reason the y population complies with p is not that they believe that p identifies the best action for them, but because they believe that x will do something which will benefit them. Simply showing someone how to increase what he takes to be his welfare is to advise him but not to control him. The element of control stems from y's belief that x can perform some relevant act.

Contract contrasts with coercion in that the former produces compliance via approach behavior while the latter produces compliance by avoidance behavior. This distinction as developed here is, it seems, logically close to many of those found at work in the research literature--for example, Bierstedt's "influence" and "power" or Martindale's "coercive" and "non-coercive persuasion."⁶ A contract like coercion may be achieved in various ways. Rhetoric, logic, deception, the withholding of information, etc., are effective methods in some cases.

Contractual control (like coercion) may be further divided into an explicit and an implicit version; that is, contractual control is a matter of "if you do this, then I'll do that." There is an explicit agreement between x and y--a tit-for-tat relationship. One may, however, do something because of what he thinks x will do. Y may follow a principal's directive because he believes that in doing so without resistance, the principal will confer upon him benefits or rewards, even though the two of them have never discussed it. Thus, the word "contract" does not always mean that all parties concerned have a conscious agreement as to the prescription-benefits relationship.

There is some consideration of authority relationships or of authority as a kind of social control in the literature. At times a distinction is made between a person's being in authority and being an authority. The latter has or possesses certain knowledge not possessed by everyone--even all well-educated people. Being an authority is being an expert. Being in authority is occupying a position by virtue of some legitimating process or action. One who is in authority has the right to give certain commands in certain situations to certain people. The scope of his authority would have to be specified by delimiting the p, s, and y variables.

In an authority control relationship, the controllee complies with the controller's prescription because he believes both that non-compliance will result in a decrease in his welfare, and that compliance will result in an increase in his welfare. X, however, is not seen as being causally relevant to the production of the consequences of either

compliance or non-compliance. For this reason, control via authority constitutes a different kind of social control than either coercion or contract. In authority relations, whether legal or expert, the controller is passive, whereas in coercive and contractual arrangements the controller is active, at least with respect to the controller's welfare.

One might question the explanatory value of this type of control. What about the patient who grants the expertise of his physician yet does not comply with his physician's prescriptions? One may value smoking more than he values not having emphysema. The patient may believe that he should comply, but not actually do what he thinks he should.

People may comply with the wishes of a person they take to be in authority because they believe the authority can take action to reduce their welfare. They recognize what they take to be the coercive potential of the authority role, which is so often spelled out in precedent or statute. But in this case the controllee's compliance is explained by coercion, not authority. In the case of legal authority, the controlled population complies because they believe that ultimately it is in their best interest to do so--although they may withhold or suspend judgment as to the overall wisdom of these particular prescriptions. Weber has called this type of control "imperative control."

III. Pedagogical Control

If this quadratic analysis is correct, then it should be useful in the analysis of teacher-student relationships. The teacher is often in the x position, with y being the student or students (actual or potential), p is the teacher in command or the prescriber, and s is a school or classroom.⁷

One might at this point question proceeding further. Granting that the above notions may be helpful in describing what in fact is going on in the schools, one can raise doubts about the appropriateness of trying to build social control into a conception of good teaching. In other words, one might say that social control has no place in pedagogy.

Given the significance of this question for present and historical concerns in philosophy of education, it behooves us to plot a strategy for responding. The first move is to show that it is indefensible to hold that the teacher (or parent) should not try to influence the child. Secondly, if one agrees that the teacher qua teacher should want to influence the child, then it could be asked whether this ought to be done via social control. The conclusions of the previous section reveal that social control is an important way in which people influence each other.

Dewey defused the old interest versus effort debate by pointing out that both sides of the either/or assumed the "externality of the object, idea, or end to be mastered to

the self."⁸ Studying was assumed to be an alien activity for children--something to be either made interesting or forced. Dewey's early point about continuity has been further supported by more recent research on childhood. Striving for cognitive competency is a mark of childhood.

This argument against authoritarian pedagogy, although inherently sound, turned out to be an Achilles' heel for Dewey; it gave a basis for an extreme non-interventionist view. The striving for cognitive competency was seen as sufficient for high-level development. If the self and the idea to be mastered were indeed continuous, then intervention by adults into this connection or relationship was uncalled for.

Yet experience has not validated this point of view. Simply keeping hands off is stifling to development; this was in effect Kozol's conclusion in "Free Schools Fail Because They Don't Teach."⁹ Trying to withhold one's experience from the child for fear of corrupting him is misguided. The adult influence is an important part of childhood.

What is wrong with extreme permissivism is that it omits our knowledge of the sources of ignorance. A teacher who "knows his subject" is in command of the assumptions, methods, and strategies which have produced ignorance as well as knowledge. The sensitive teacher intervenes when the thinking is headed down a blind alley or pursues a hopeless tangent. However, when thinking is going well, the teacher should keep pretty much out of it. Simple as it may seem, this view constitutes a structure for holding back the mandibles of authoritarianism and permissivism.

If this discussion is basically correct, then we should be concerned with the kind of social-control relationships which should exist between teachers and children, for these are unavoidable avenues to influencing. In other words, the teacher cannot (and indeed should not want to) avoid being engaged in a social control relationship. That is, any adult whose prescriptions or directives are viewed by the child as being irrelevant will be educationally useless, for the child will have no interest in what is being taught.

I am not claiming that one person has an interest in another only if he can use the other person in some way. To say that our interest in other people stems from what we see as being beneficial to us sounds too crude for philosophical ears; but if we don't assume a closed system of benefit wherein what one receives another must give up, then it is not unreasonable to ask oneself which people are worth being interested in. It would be rather ridiculous to set out to interact with all people equally. The first consequence would be to trivialize human interaction--the way politicians do a few days before the election. Being human is making choices. Some of these choices, the humanistic ones, involve selecting the who's and how's of human interaction. To say that a child will assess adults (and peers) in terms of his own

theory of benefit or value system is not to reduce childhood to egomania. This follows from P.D. Smith's point:

. . .if it is shown that one learns to take into account the desires of others--if one learns to strive for harmony of interests rather than a stubborn and selfish dominance--if one learns this because of the prudential value of so doing, it is merely psychologizing (a form of the genetic fallacy) to argue that therefore all altruism is disguised selfishness.¹⁰

Children as well as teachers or parents may wish to engage in social-control relationships--for example the child who sees the teacher as knowledgeable and seeks his advice. But when are such relationships appropriate? This requires a type-by-type review of social control.

IV. Pedagogical Coercion

The old ditty of "reading, 'riting, and 'rithmetic taught to the tune of a hick'ry stick" vividly expresses the point that teaching often involves the use of coercion. Moreover, the use of a hickory stick by one person upon another is what many educators find dehumanizing. To inflict physical pain is as dehumanizing to the inflictor as to the inflicted, and probably a good deal more so. Of course, the hickory stick is not the only instance of coercion found in a home or school. There are fewer overt moves one can make. Removing the infliction of physical pain is not to remove the use of coercion. All of the things children do because they are afraid of what adults will do to them are instances of control by coercion. Many times an adult will not be aware of the child's belief that the adult will take some action which the child believes harmful. Coercion derives from the controllee's beliefs--though it is often the case that adults consciously use coercion on children. Saying to a child, "If you don't. . . I'll . . ." as is common in public places as graffiti.

Much effort is devoted to thinking up new benefits to be set before the child but to be withheld from him if he doesn't do something. The child's view of what constitutes benefits is modified so as to make him more susceptible to social control. The trick is to develop in the mind of the controllee those benefits which one can dispense or withdraw. The things we "have to have" are usually brought to our consciousness by those who mete them out. The so-called permissive educators have not been all that removed from the use of coercion; to get a child to believe that unless one is accepted or liked by a teacher and/or peers one is a less worthwhile human being is to increase the prospects of control. Those who can turn on and turn off this acceptance have power over the pupil. Some educators find this much more insidious than the obvious hickory stick.

The question of coercion cannot be avoided pedagogically. As long as a child views the adult as being somehow relevant to the child's benefits or desirable status, then that adult has potential control over the child. If the child believes the adult will actually reduce the child's welfare (as seen by the child) if the child does not comply, then by definition the adult has coercive control over the child.

The more soft-hearted, hands-off, or romantic educator might take the position that coercion has no place in child rearing; that is, that the adult should not take any action which is perceived by the child as hurting or decreasing his welfare, let alone actually harming the child. Ruling out the use of perceived harm is to rule out the use of coercion. This may sound very acceptable to some educators, but I think that some coercion can be seen as desirable for educational reasons.

Consider the person who wants to be an M.D. so strongly that he enrolls in a "pre-med" program. There are, as we all know, going to be days when the person does not want to study but does so out of fear of poor grades. His more basic goal acts as a kind of motivational flywheel which gets him over the more or less immediate losses of purpose. This is desirable, it seems to me; but it is fear of loss of benefit which does the motivating. Coercion in this case is a necessary evil, but nevertheless instrumentally justified.

One might want to be engaged in a control relationship for just this reason. Students have often said to me that they just could not study on their own, i.e., that they needed the "structure" of being formally enrolled in a course. Part of this structure is the fear of a poor grade if they do not do the reading. Fortunately, students are somewhat selective as to which teachers they are to be controlled by--beliefs about expert authority are involved; but even if they are, this offers an example of how coercion can function positively in pedagogy.

V. Pedagogical Contracts

Social control through contracts is very familiar to anyone who has ever taught or been taught. It is often explicit in that a deal is made between student and teacher--"if you will. . . then I will. . . ." If it would be good for me to have a gold star next to my name on a public billboard, and if I can spell twenty previously specified words correctly upon request and will receive such a star from the teacher, then I am willing to comply with the directive, "Master your spelling lesson." The PRC (Permanent Record Card) values--grades, teacher comments, ranks, diplomas, certificates, degrees, etc.--have a kind of double control aspect about them; that is, they render their valuer as susceptible to both coercion and contract. If one does not learn one's lesson, one will receive a bad grade; but if one studies, one will receive a good grade.

P. S. Wilson has noted that children's interests are often "used" on them.¹¹ Consequently, children often hide their real interests from their teachers so as to deprive their social controllers of additional resources for controlling them. For example, a teacher who knows that a student is very much interested in playing at the water table can set up a situation so that the student can engage in this activity only if some other task is completed. It will then become part of the skill of "studenting" to keep the teacher guessing as to one's real interests. The extent to which this hiding actually goes on in school is a question for empirical research. Nevertheless, every teacher should examine his practices, i.e., monitor behavior, in order to know whether he is producing such hiding in students. This is suggested not as a caution to those who wish to improve their ability to use children's interests upon them, but to warn against engaging in the practice unreflectively or uncritically.

Green and Lepper warned teachers against extrinsically rewarding students for doing what they would have done willingly without such rewards.¹² They think that setting up rewards external to the activity prescribed by the teacher is destructive to the child's finding intrinsic value in that same activity. Some fear, furthermore, that reliance upon extrinsic rewards in pedagogy will produce a kind of crude instrumentalism in children--a kind of what's in-it-for-me attitude.

Although these are philosophical problems about the meaning of "intrinsic," this concern fits the present paper in that the rewarding stems from an action the teacher must take to produce the benefit for the child--like giving a gold star. The child views the teacher as being causally relevant to the increased benefit which will be realized through compliance. In a contractual relationship the child complies because of the teacher's active role in dispensing rewards. In other words, we are not here concerned with the child's doing P to get Q in the general case; but only with P to Q relations where the teacher (or parent) is an intervening causal factor, in the child's view of things. Thus, the second half of the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction is itself subdivided. Some activities are engaged in for their own sake and some are engaged in for what they lead to or produce, so the distinction goes. Of these latter type activities, there are those whose products occur because of the teacher's (or controller's) actions and those whose products do not. The instrumentality of following the prescription or prescribed behavior may thus be of two types: teacher created, and non-teacher created.

Resentment of teachers by students can be produced by teachers who use coercion or contract which stems from arbitrariness. If I desire Q, and I can see no relationship between P and Q except my teacher's linking of them, then while I comply I do so believing that the teacher is acting arbitrarily or perhaps for some hidden motive. Educationally, P had better be of great value, for the teacher has paid a considerable price for it. Whatever has been learned from doing P is

only a part of the learning experience; for the child has also learned, to put it mildly, that teachers often act arbitrarily. But can a child learn to act rationally in an environment where adults do not?

One might rebut this by saying that the child cannot always understand the teacher's reasons, i.e., cannot see the real value in what the teacher prescribes; and in such cases, it is far better to use extrinsic rewards than to use coercion. Perhaps so, but this still assumes that at times it is acceptable pedagogical practice to go beyond the student's level of reasoning by rigging the situation so that compliance results from bribery or arbitrariness. In a rational relationship the teacher would, if contractual control is to be used at all, set the rewards such that they were rationally tied to the worth of following the prescription. Assuming the activity prescribed by the teacher is itself justifiable but that students would not choose it if left to make their own decisions as to what to do, the teacher should set extrinsic rewards only if the student can be convinced that the prescribed activity itself is instrumental in producing the rewards (as seen by the student). This pulls the prescriptions and benefits together and removes the air of arbitrariness; of course, it drastically reduces the number of rewards to which a teacher can appeal. The students' view of what is a benefit is now a delimiter of what the teacher may prescribe. This rules out moves such as, "If you correctly complete your math homework, then you may have fifteen minutes additional recess tomorrow." Such arbitrariness is replaced with: "If you correctly complete your math homework, then tomorrow we can begin to study functions using that water table you have been so interested in, since you will then have the necessary skills."

This heads off the objection that if children have no student purposes, one must coerce or bribe them into it. Student purposes are necessary to have a pedagogical relationship; but many public school teachers face charges who are not truly students. What should they do? It would be strange to find that children had no likes or desires or interests. The teacher could appeal to these interests in setting contractual arrangements. If one were to try to engage children in a pedagogical relationship but could find no interests or desires on their part which would serve as a basis for study, then is it not acceptable at this point to use coercive or contractual control? The trouble with this question is methodological: how sure does one have to be that there are no such interests?

VI. Pedagogical Authority

Kenneth Benne has given considerable attention to the relationship between authority and education. He has identified three types of authority relations. First, there is expert authority, such as the physician-patient relationship. The physician bears the authority, the patient is the subject of authority, who "grants willing obedience to the doctor's advice or commands because of a perceived relevance of the

doctor's competence to his own need. . .";¹³ likewise, an authority relation involves the field of authority, which "is conjointly delimited by the intersection of the doctor's competence and the patient's need. The field is real or objective as opposed to the patient's or physician's perception of it." Benne emphasizes that such relationships are "grounded in a persistent differentiation of function and specialized ability between bearer and subject."¹⁴

From this brief review, it can be seen that the x variable in the quadratic definition of social control corresponds to the bearer, while y corresponds to the subject of expert authority. It was concluded that it is desirable to pull out the prescription variable p from the interactional setting s. The field does not correspond to either of these but is appealed to in the explanation of y's compliance. The patient perceives x as having knowledge relevant to his own improvement. Thus, there is no inconsistency between Benne's view of authority and the notion of social controls being considered, though the two are different.

Secondly, Benne discusses the authority of rules. In, for example, a game, the players are the subjects of authority via "the decision by particular groups of people to act and interact in and through them."¹⁵ On the present view, the particular rules of the game being considered constitute an instantiation of the p variable. The y variable is obviously the players, and the setting of the game is described in s. The x variable seems to be instantiated by the same population as is the y variable, that is, those who play a game impose the rules of the game upon themselves.

Thirdly, what Benne calls "anthropological authority" is to be considered. The medical student exemplifies a subject of this type of authority. The student, unlike the patient, wants to become a physician, "and the doctor's purpose in relating to the student is to help him to become a doctor."¹⁶ This goal involves "a movement toward collegiality between teacher and student."¹⁷ Medical education is initiation into the medical community.

Benne holds that this medical education example "suggests the distinctive characteristics of the anthropological authority relation, in comparison with expert and rule authority."¹⁸ I think that it can be shown that this example does not set out the differences alluded to at all but, rather, obscures some aspects of pedagogical authority. This type of authority may be characterizable but it does not serve as well as a theory of the authority of the teacher. Much of Benne's account is concerned with the nature of worthwhile community life or the good society. This aspect of Benne's paper, which is central to it, is not here being accepted or rejected. The interest is in what is implied about the teacher as an authority.

If we distinguish among (1) the patient, (2) the medical practitioner, (3) the medical student, and (4) the medical

educator, Benne's example fails. The practitioner is the bearer of authority and the medical student is the subject. The field varies in these two cases. In the first case knowledge of medical practice is relevant, and in the latter, knowledge of pedagogical practice constitutes the field. The problem is that in both cases the relationship is an expert authority relationship. The physician does not interact with the patient to make him into a physician, nor does the medical educator as a teacher intend to produce another medical educator. Teaching one how to practice medicine is to be distinguished from teaching one how to practice pedagogy.

The criticism is intended to be more penetrating than simply taking issue with an example. Teaching people something makes them, when successful, more like the teacher in that the discrepancy in what is known by both is reduced. One can agree with those philosophers of education who see teaching as an initiation into a way of life, and yet not view the proper goal of teaching as always producing teachers. Knowledge of how to teach is not always the proper curriculum content. Benne's paper is, it seems to me, more concerned with what should be taught than with the nature of pedagogical authority.

The claim that the authority of the teacher is that of expert authority does not amount to our "falling into the trap of automatically thinking of education as the transmission of culture to primitive and barbaric people by those already enculturated, rather than as the mutual renewal and reconstruction of persons-in-cultures."¹⁹ If we develop a pedagogical epistemology, the study of how one brings someone else to know, then it seems reasonable to speak of the teacher as one who knows how to bring the student to know. This is, as Kohlberg has often pointed out, not the same as a cultural transmission theory of teaching. It is the student who comes to know through his reconstruction of his own ideas.

To return to the consideration of the authority of the teacher as one type of pedagogical control, the student complies with the teacher's commands p in s because he believes that such compliance will result in maintaining or increasing his well-being. This belief is based upon another belief or confidence in the competence of the teacher. One may believe that he and his teacher possess the same basic goals. The comments of practicing teachers as to how one must be trusted by the students seems to be relevant. Trusting one's teacher means having confidence in the teacher's purposes and believing that he can select and utilize effective methods. This seems to be the basis of the student's seeing a teacher as a model for behavior. Doing what the teacher does (imitation) or what one thinks the teacher would have done (identification) stems from believing that the teacher knows or can do something the student wants to know or be able to do.

As students, it is important to be able to determine whether a particular person is the expert teacher he claims to be. How can one determine whether a given person is such an expert? Perhaps it is ultimately the case that you have to be one to judge one; but in most cases the one in need of an expert is not himself an expert. Lewis White Beck²⁰ has suggested four tests for authority which are useful here.

(1) Does the alleged authority have proper credentials as an expert on the matter in question? Are there any public signs of this person's expertise? Diplomas, certificates, and the like indicate that a person has or possesses a certain knowledge base. This test is not, of course, error free. (2) Does the alleged authority attempt to persuade you by appeals to reason and to acknowledged facts, or by emotional and propagandistic appeals? (3) Does the alleged authority permit examination of his reasons and disagreement with his decisions, or does he condemn and punish those who dare question? Again, to know for sure that an alleged expert's reasons are adequate in terms of one's profession requires one being competent within that profession. Nevertheless, we can make judgments as to whether a person tries, or had the disposition or attitude, to appeal to research or theory in giving answers to the relevant "why" questions as opposed to suppressing objections. This emphasizes again the need for professional teachers to be able to answer "why" questions--for knowing something about the nature of justification. (4) Does the alleged authority stand to gain by our believing in him? It is often said that a professional person can put his client's interests ahead of his own narrow personal interests. Do we have any reason to believe that the authority will profit personally from our compliance with his prescriptions? These tests are, of course, far from foolproof; but they do give us a basis for judgment which is more objective than unconditional compliance with either any alleged authority or hearsay evidence.

The first test of expert authority can be used by students in school contexts. In medicine and law, when one enters a professional's office one is confronted with displays of diplomas and the like. Educators however, seldom display credential. I think that students should have access to this type of information. They should know the school from which their teachers have been graduated and with what degrees. Teachers should display their diplomas and memberships in honorary societies and the like. I would suggest further that an up-to-date vita for each faculty be on file and conveniently available to students.

Beck's second and third tests require that teachers appeal to the student's reasoning ability to justify, when called upon, their prescriptions for student behavior. Appeal to social roles, power, and the like are not pedagogical moves which convince students of a teacher's expertise, and will probably erode their confidence. Again, one could object by noting that students do not always possess the cognitive skills to understand and evaluate the teacher's reasons.

Yet, it seems that when a student seriously asks about a teacher command, he deserves a reply expressed at the same level of sophistication as the question. If a student knows enough to ask a question, then the student knows enough to assess some evidence for compliance.

The fourth test is often failed by teachers. Requiring students to do things which will ease the teacher's load may or may not be justifiable. Teachers often stand to gain by students' doing some long assignment. We as students would not be convinced of the educational value of tasks given us to get out of the teacher's hair. These tests are not only tests for students; they also provide a vehicle for a teacher's self-evaluation. What kinds of responses does one give to students? Are these responses consistent with one's image as a competent teacher ready to help a student learn?

The teacher is in the role of legal authority in that he occupies a position in a social structure. This is not just a matter of a state legislature defining the teacher's role. Within every school there exists some organizing structure which, whether formal or informal, assigns certain rights and responsibilities to teachers, students, and other members of the school's social system. Students view teachers as being able to make certain requests of them by virtue of their position within the institution. In other words, a student may obey a teacher's directive or command not because he sees the teacher as an expert or as one who can dispense or withhold benefit, but because it is the teacher's role in certain situations to issue directives, commands, or prescriptions.

I do not think that this adopts the "command theory of authority" analyzed by Goldstone and Tunnell.²¹ They reject the view that being in authority is equated with having the right to command. They do not deny, as I understand it, the claim that at times being in authority is having the right to command. Their account allows for some social control coming from someone being seen as being in authority.

It seems to me that one function of the school should be to move those who comply with teacher prescriptions, because of the teacher's legal authority, toward seeing the teacher as an expert authority. Compliance, however, will result in this case only if the school's clients adopt student purposes. Under a policy of compulsory attendance this may seem naive. But what justification is there for requiring school attendance for those who are predicted on good evidence never to adopt student purposes? The school is a sociopolitical institution built to provide an environment suitable for initiating and sustaining pedagogical relationships. On the positive side, rare is the person who rejects pedagogical relationships altogether; more likely, one rejects the types of learnings contained in the relationships one has known.

Finally, I will venture the hypothesis that in any complex sociopolitical institution such as a school some persons will for functional reasons be in authority. The overall quality and humaneness of the institution will in direct ways be a function of how those persons in authority conduct themselves.

VII. "Self-Educated"

From these considerations of teacher control, one can gain a slightly different perspective on another aspect of the notion of studying. One often encounters the expression "self-educated" in talk of education. What is taken as positive about being self-educated (i.e., when self-educated is taken as a good-making characteristic) stems from its being taken as good that a person (1) had clear educational purposes and (2) pursued these in an effective manner without being exposed to the normal proddings received by schoollees. The self-educated person is one who had self-control and knew how to be a student in situations where there was no social control functioning.

But is not self-control a form of social control? If not, then what kind of distinction is this? How does the concept of self-control fit with the notion of social control developed above? An individual may prescribe to himself on certain occasions. Castenada argues that this is what is called "intending," i.e., issuing a first-person prescription.²² Counter to this concept, Moutafakes claims, in effect, that this breaks the law of parsimony for it postulates "personal egos talking to personal egos."²³ In present terminology, one ego seems to be a member of the x population and the other ego is a member of the y population.

I believe, however, that Castenada can be defended here: To prescribe to oneself is to formulate a prescription just as one might prescribe to another. What gives the prescription "I" reference is the agent's accepting the prescription which he has formulated as applying to himself. The person accepts the prescriptivity of the sentence which he has constructed. Thus, there is no postulation of unnecessary entities. This in turn indicates that self-control should not be seen as a type of social control, for it is not the case that x and y are different populations. The definition being discussed requires that y believe that either his non-compliance with x's prescription will result in x's taking some action or actions which will result in a reduction or depreciation of y's welfare, or his compliance with x's prescription will lead x to take some action or actions which will result in an enhancement of y's welfare. It would be strange for an individual to believe that if he did not comply with his own prescriptions he would take some action to reduce his own welfare. Likewise he is free to reward himself for doing what he thinks is right. But this seems very different from a theory of interpersonal relationships.

This perceived difference on my part could be illusory. Skinner says that "One person manages another in the sense in which he manages himself."²⁴ Modification of the contingencies is the core of both cases. Thus, for Skinner there is no basic difference between self-management (control) and managing (controlling) another person. Moreover, "When techniques of self-management have been learned, the instructional contingencies maintained by the verbal community may no longer be needed."²⁵ Skinner, thus, is consistent with the older conclusion in philosophy of education that the main end of education is learning to learn autonomously--learning to be a self-educator.

Finally, there are some grounds for distinguishing being a pupil and being a student--as my one time colleague, William Hare, used to point out. The ordinary language practice in America of referring to very young school children as "pupils" while reserving "students" for older people has some merit. Students are autonomous with respect to holding and pursuing student purposes, while pupils are not. Pupils are in a sense novice students. Much of being a pupil is learning to become a student.²⁶

FOOTNOTES:

1. Jerome A. Popp, "Studying" in R. Pratte (ed.) Philosophy of Education 1975: Proceedings of the Thirty-First Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society.
2. This assumes ontogenetic study as opposed to phylogenetic study.
3. It could be that the child thinks the book belongs to the parent and is interested in it for that reason. As we shall see, this is actually a case of expert control.
4. William K. Spady, "Authority, Conflict, and Teacher Effectiveness," Educational Researcher 2, (January 1973): 4-10.
5. J. R. Lucas, Freedom of the Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 7.
6. Robert M. Bierstedt, "An Analysis of Social Power," American Sociological Review 15 (1950): 731; Martindale, Institutions, Organizations, and Mass Society, 1962, p. 292; Amitai Atzioni in "Social Control: Organizational Aspects," in International Encyclopedia of Social Science, 1968, p. 397, distinguishes Normative, Coercive, and Utilitarian controls. I reject these labels for the justificational connotations. The first and third are contractual while the second is coercive.
7. Note that either party of the pedagogical relation may wish to create it: students control their teachers in various ways. The student prescriptions are seldom explicitly formulated and delivered to the teacher, but the

teacher is, nevertheless, often aware of the contractual nature of the situation--political deals often are never stated explicitly. This aspect of the pedagogical relationship will be left undeveloped. For an example of how students controlled their teachers through behavior modification, see P. S. Granbard and H. Rosenberg, Classrooms That Work (New York: Rutton, 1974).

8. John Dewey in Interest and Effort in Education (New York: Augustus M. Kelly, 1913).
9. Johnathan Kozol "Free Schools Fail Because They Don't Teach," Psychology Today 5 (April 1972).
10. P. G. Smith, "Knowledge and Value," Educational Theory (Winter 1975): 29-39.
11. Interest and Discipline in Education (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971).
12. Green and Lepper, "How to Turn Play into Work," Psychology Today (October 1972).
13. Kenneth Benne, "Authority in Education," Harvard Educational Review 40 (1970): 395.
14. Ibid., p. 395.
15. Ibid., p. 398.
16. Ibid., p. 400.
17. Ibid., p. 400.
18. Ibid., p. 401.
19. Ibid., p. 400.
20. Lewis White Beck, Philosophic Inquiry (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962), pp. 45-49.
21. Goldstone and Tunnell, "A Critique of the Command Theory of Authority," Educational Theory, 25 (Spring 1975): 131-138.
22. Castenada, "Intentions and Intendings," American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1972): 139-149.
23. Moutafakes, "Towards an Analysis of Discourse Concerning Intentions," International Logic Review 4 (1973): 274.
24. B. F. Skinner, About Behaviorism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), p. 180.
25. Ibid., p. 180.
26. This paper is indebted to Maurée Popp who never read these pages, but who helped me understand them.

AGEISM AND THE YOUTH CULT: EDUCATIONAL DILEMMAS

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We are very much aware of the changes that have transpired in the past half century, and the effects of technology are often praised or blamed in light of these changes. One change, however, which we have yet to take cognizance of, is that more and more persons are living long enough to reach the age of 65 and beyond. It is not that people are necessarily living longer, but that more and more people are surviving to old age. What this means is that along with the outmoding of so many aspects of our culture, our ways of educating people have also become obsolete.

Older persons in our society are regarded as either incapable of, or uninterested in, learning. This attitude has served to reinforce the general view of aging as a period of gradual physiological and intellectual decline. This myth, however, is one that gerontologists are striving to disprove, and the merging facts are that, not only is there little evidence of a decrement in intelligence with age, but that there may well be an increment in intellectual functioning from adulthood to advanced age. The association of aging with declining abilities is also being rapidly disproved by the increasing numbers of physically and mentally healthy persons who are currently experiencing old age.

The second myth to which we have so long subscribed that it is virtually engrained in our culture, is that education is primarily the province of the young. Most of what is known about teaching has been derived from experience with teaching children under conditions of compulsory attendance. We have long been concerned about the disadvantaged youth, the effects of class stigma on the young, and emotional disturbances created by racial discrimination experienced in childhood. Minority groups have also received their share of the educationists' attention. Little note, however, has been taken of older persons as a particularly disadvantaged group, either in regard to equality of educational opportunity, age discrimination, or as a group with specific needs brought on by the onset of age. Little mention is made of a late-start to match the head-start movement, yet compensatory education is as much a need for older persons as it is for the young.

A publishing firm recently sent out flyers advertising its latest educational publication which deals primarily with the equality of educational opportunity. There were long arguments presented for the need of equality in education, and that the battle against discrimination be continued. It was concluded that the withholding of educational opportunity from any

group was an abrogation of human rights. The entire discussion, however, dealt only with education from pre-school through graduate school. Such a truncated vision of equality and educational opportunity is reflected in many educational theories and philosophies.

The dominant view of education by philosophers has been primarily that of determining how young persons should be prepared to meet the challenges of maturity and adulthood. As a result the focus of attention has been upon young learners. Philosophies of education have been elaborated and studied from a limited perspective--as if learning were a task which concerned only the first third of life, but which rapidly declined in interest and relevance outside of in-service training to sharpen the skills and competencies of employees, rather than attempting to meet the needs and interests of human beings. The practical orientation of American educational philosophy, in general, has obsolescence built into its structure. The current disaffection with educational systems is proof of its limited function.

That the emphasis in educational philosophy has been upon young persons is a further manifestation of our lack of concern and interest in persons as they advance beyond middle-age. This is another way in which we reinforce the notion that learning is only something young people are capable of doing, and underscores our orientation toward youth and youthfulness as a society. Although there are occasional philosophical statements with respect to the idea that learning continues throughout life, this is not to mean that such education should include the kind of learning that goes on within classrooms. Lifelong learning can and does occur, but life-span education, in a more formal sense, does not occur, and it is just this kind of opportunity to learn that older persons need. The opportunity to move in and out of the educational setting is a natural way of learning, but we are so beset by routines and regulations that getting admitted to a school is tantamount to being admitted to a hospital, and is sometimes just as painful. You have either to exhibit a lack of something or to require a remedy for something.

It is difficult for many of us to accept the notion that equality of educational opportunity includes cutting across age levels as well as all the other strata that surround us. Along with being youth-oriented, we are also ageists in the sense that many persons are racists or sexists. We do not admire the old; we do not envy them; we do not want to be a part of them; nor do we want them around. We would far rather forget that they exist. They are reminders not only of the fact that one day we too will grow old, but in a technological society, older persons are symbolic of death. In a society that has advanced in the way that ours has, people who die are either victims of accidents, are soldiers, or are those who have grown old.

Philosophies of education, along with having as their principle focus the educating of young persons, are intent upon the educating of these persons in ways that will enhance their lives as working or producing individuals. We neglect to consider the need for educating for the increasing amounts of leisure time that will be at our disposal in the not too distant future. The use of leisure time requires preparation, just as entry into the work force requires some form of preparation. And, further, such preparation must begin in the early years of schooling so that thinking about the use of future time is part of the educational process. Preparation for life, in a very practical sense, today means preparation for the use of leisure time. Interests must be cultivated early in life and progressively developed, so that such activities can continue to be meaningful and life-enhancing in years to come.

In planning for the future, the attitudes of the young will also have to be dramatically altered. The traditional "I wonder what I'll be when I am big some day. . ." may well take the form of "I wonder if my educational background will be sufficiently flexible to meet the challenges of the future, and whether I shall have the inner resources to make my life meaningful when faced with twenty years or more of retirement."

Another area which is relevant for considerations of education as a life-span process is the need to change attitudes toward aging itself. We need to develop a realistic attitude as to what constitutes aging and to arrive at some determinants of what in fact is normal aging. At this point in time we do not know. Again, philosophies of education have had broad, global statements to offer in respect to how man views other men, etc., but there is no recognition that age does create differences, not only in terms of social roles, but in the very way that a person is perceived. Sex also bears this implicit distinction.

The nature of our humanity is put to a true test when we examine what are our provisions for all persons within our society. Unfortunately, in the case of older persons, the scales are sadly out of balance. It is difficult to discuss even one aspect of aging without encountering the perennial philosophical question of justice. There is an old saying: How a nation treats its older population reveals its true aspirations for men. Our own nation would not fare well in such an examination. Perhaps rather than viewing education from the beginning of life and proceeding from the needs of children as they grow toward maturity, education ought better to be studied from the perspective of old age. Perhaps thus we will be able to determine what our human needs may be in terms of the total life-span.

A re-evaluation of today's schooling from the viewpoint of the needs of older adults may also provide us with the proper perspective by which to assess the contribution of education to an individual's entire life-span. This has

particular significance in light of the fact that the life-span may soon be lengthened. The retirement age is also consistently being lowered. An individual may well live twenty years beyond the date of his retirement. It is highly probable that during that period he will be quite healthy, both physically and mentally. The trauma that often accompanies retirement could be offset by preparation and planning for this later stage in life. There is no reason to suppose that the last third of the life-span need be less productive and meaningful than any other portion of existence. Opportunities will need to be provided for late-life careers, evolving interests, volunteer opportunities, and so on.

The curricula of schools have been much criticized for their lack of relevancy to current issues in life and their attendant problems. Such criticism has been directed primarily toward areas such as subject matter, course content, methods or styles of teaching, and the like. No one has seriously questioned whether educational curricula are realistic in still another sense, that is, whether the experience of education has any relevance for the entire human life-span. We have become accustomed to considering techniques for the education of children and the young as the only models for educational efficacy. We neglect to take into account that many of our students in the future will be older than our currently expected school population. This will make a difference in curricula, building design, and teaching styles, only to mention a few areas.

We need to pay greater heed to the linkage between human developmental stages within the life-span, and the processes of education. Homer, Socrates, Jesus--all spoke to mature audiences, not just to the young. Today the reverse is true. The young and the preparation of the young for adulthood consume our educational energies and financial resources. Changes in schooling are necessary to adequately prepare children for social changes produced by the new era of aging. Training which may have been adequate for the countless generations which have preceded ours will no longer suffice. If education for the new demands and opportunities these people will confront is to be adequate, careful consideration must be given to probably new developments during young people's lifetime, as well as those which have already taken place.

Education for life has long been an educational slogan, but, in reality, what such a slogan pointed to was one third of the lifespan--or until a person reached school-leaving age. There is little in the traditional school curricula which educates persons for successful living from childhood through old age and, ultimately, death. There is the assumption that once a person approaches middle-age, he continues like Jack Benny to be 39 for the remainder of his life. Our youth-centered culture supports this notion. The fact that one out of every ten Americans is now over the age of 65 is seldom taken into consideration in educational planning. By the mid 1990's, there will be over 29 million persons within the 65+ age group.

A significant part of the curriculum should be devoted to the development of the understanding of the processes of aging, gaining sensitivity to areas where intervention is possible and needs to be implemented, and so on. Young persons need to establish a familiarity with the concept of aging--if only to begin to better understand the persons that they will become.

Because of the obvious importance of both exercise and recreation, there will need to be increased recognition of physical education for all of life and not just for the young. In this connection there seems to be a heightened need for physical education programs in the schools to move away from team and spectator sports which are difficult to pursue in adult years, toward individualized sports, which can be continued throughout life. This may also have an effect on the competitive nature of our society, which has heretofore fostered team sports as a self reflection.

Authorities in the field of aging insist that intelligent application of existing knowledge in regard to health practices should produce an average life expectancy of 90 to 100 or more years. Many of these years may well be spent at a level of functional capacity as high as or higher than that experienced by the average older person today. It is not unreasonable to conjecture that there is a real possibility that breakthroughs in such areas as cancer, cardiovascular renal diseases, and continued progress in control of accidents, diseases of early infancy, influenza, pneumonia, and other causes of death, may dramatically alter our demographic structure. Such possibilities will challenge educational theories and philosophies. Current life-expectancy tables indicate that the average fifth-grader will attain at least an age of 72. It is not at all unrealistic to base training of children now in school on the probability that a high percentage will live past 90 and many beyond 100 years. To do otherwise is to take a chance on seriously intensifying the problems of the future for both society and the individual.

Because of longer life expectancy, the individual must recognize the probability that he will continue to live and function at a high level long after his own children are grown and have become independent. This suggests that he will have to broaden his interests beyond the narrow confines of earning a living and possibly maintaining a family. To the extent that he has a choice in jobs or careers, he may want to move more carefully with flexibility a major consideration. We may now be justified in educating persons in anticipation of their future life-span, with educational opportunity a continuous possibility. Such an open view of education may give reality to a concept which has long been only an educational and political ideas--the notion of the philosopher-king.

In order to seriously initiate life-span education, it is becoming increasingly important to determine which behaviors improve with age. One such possibility is wisdom. This is

something the ancients had always granted the old, but which with the advent of modern technology has come to be regarded as unnecessary or ineffective, if, in fact, it has ever existed at all. Another possibility is self-awareness. This second possibility is suggested by bio-feedback research and has great implications for the control of biological processes with resultant effects on behavior.

By identifying areas in which older persons have superior abilities, educators can design programs which will maximize their learning. A focus on increments with age, rather than decrements, as is currently done, may well lead to educational programs which will revolutionize our entire notion of what education is and could become. It is reasonable to assume that there may well be areas in which older persons demonstrate capabilities superior to those of other age groups.

It has long been recognized that educational efforts need to develop an emphasis which brings about the integration of scientific knowledge with human values, and critical analyses of scientific efforts, along with a commitment to dealing with social problems. Older persons can play a vital role in this re-direction of such educational efforts. Through their experience, older persons have developed perseverance, insights in regard to human values, and a concern for the future direction of human life.

There is today an unprecedented opportunity for philosophers of education to make an invaluable contribution to education and to society. Philosophies of education which deliberately concern themselves with life-span education are desperately needed. Education which stops at even the graduate level is no longer sufficient to help an individual cope with personal, vocational, and social change. Some educators suggest that what is needed is a new term to describe the new educational development. Since the word pedagogy is limited, it should be discarded. A term such as andragogy is more fitting for the goals of life-span education--that is, helping human beings to learn, regardless of age.¹

FOOTNOTES

1. Malcolm S. Knowles, The Modern Practice of Adult Education (New York: Association Press, 1970).

A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF RICHARD H. BROWN'S
PURSUIT OF GENUINE QUESTIONS IN HISTORY

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Between 1959 and 1972 an attempt was made to alter the way American history was being taught in secondary schools. The endeavor was known as the Amherst Project and its Director was Dr. Richard H. Brown, an eminent historian and educator. As Director, Brown played a major role in the development of the Project's goals. The Project developed a learning theory that was based on a set of philosophical and psychological assumptions. This paper will describe and criticize the method of learning and definition of history as a subject in the curriculum that was propounded by Brown and the Amherst Project.

In its philosophy of learning theory, the Amherst Project assumes that learning occurs: (1) when the learner encounters some new phenomena, (2) within the learner, and (3) as a consequence of something the learner does. Brown uses the term "inquiry" to describe the learner's activity. Addressing the Organization of American Historians, Brown has said that ". . . the inquiry hypothesis holds that learning is most effective when students perform in some fashion as inquirers, rather than when they are asked merely to master passively the conclusions of others."¹ In an earlier writing he uses the term "discovery learning" in reference to the same phenomenon:

In its simplest form [discovery learning] rests on the hypothesis that the student learns best as an active inquirer--by asking questions and pursuing their answers--rather than when he is asked, as an end in itself, to master the answers of others to questions which may be quite irrelevant to him or which he may only dimly understand. Discovery learning rests, in short, on the idea that the way the scholar learns may be a useful model for all learning, including that which goes on in a classroom. Its application to the schools rests on the a priori assumption that the schools are intended to be institutions where students (1) learn and (2) learn how to learn in order that they may go on learning through life.²

Inquiry, according to Brown, has four characteristics, namely, curiosity, motivation, focus and the total experience that the learner brings to the encounter. Curiosity, the first element, is ". . . whatever it is that impels the prospective

learner's encounter with any new fact, phenomenon or experience."³ The learner is surrounded by a countless number of stimuli, each one vying for his attention. Somehow the learner senses that if he deals with one of these stimuli it will somehow be relevant to him. Perhaps the encounter with the stimulus will teach him something that he needs to know, or perhaps it will be a highly satisfying experience that he will treasure. Curiosity, then, is a highly personal matter. Brown illustrates:

The things I am curious about. . .include Martin Van Buren, the Chicago Cubs and the question of how people learn. Knowing something about these subjects, it satisfies me for a variety of reasons to learn more--and in addition I have a conceptual apparatus that makes it easy for me to learn more. I am a sucker for anybody who comes along with something to tell me about any of them. I am also potentially curious about a number of other things about which I know nothing, if but only if I apprehend them in suitable fashion: if the medium is one that I can use and if the conceptual tools that I already possess are in some way applicable to the new subject so that I have some way of getting a handle on it.⁴

Motivation, the second essential ingredient in inquiry, is the feeling that the learner has to employ his curiosity in a particular encounter. The learner is curious enough about a problem to want to know more about it. The learner can learn from an encounter providing that no impediment is present. Brown explains:

I may be enormously curious about the Cubs. . . but if new information about them is offered to me in Russian, which I do not understand, I will not be motivated to learn. If it comes to me in some form of English which sounds foreign to my ears, I may hear it, but imperfectly. In like manner if the information comes from a source which has provided faulty information about the Cubs in the past, my motivation to learn will be lessened. And, if the information comes to me in surroundings that I innately distrust, I am likely to distrust the information itself or to be less interested in it.⁵

Thus if the learner feels frustrated, baffled or distrustful, he will not feel motivated to be curious about the encounter.

The way in which the learner organizes his impressions of the encounter comprises his focus, the third part of inquiry.⁶ Focus determines what the learner sees and what he chooses not to see, and it is usually expressed through words in the form of a question or, more usually, a hypothesis.

The fourth and last element in inquiry is the total experience that the learner brings to the encounter. Experience is defined as ". . .the sum of all that has happened to [the learner] and is happening to him up to the moment of encounter, including what he knows and feels, what his concerns are, what he is aware of and sensitive to, and how he communicates."⁷ Each person's total experience is different and each person's total experience determines his reaction to an encounter. Brown elaborates this point:

Each of you in this room is at this moment tuning in and out what I say according to your experience. You hear some sentences and not others, and each person is hearing different sentences. While everything I say has meaning for me, your varied experiences enable each of you to hear some things and not others. Some words I use have meaning to you, while others do not. Some ideas square sufficiently with your own experiences that you hear them whether you agree or not, while with others the disjuncture between our two experiences is so great that you fail to hear them entirely. So it is, constantly, in our communication with each other, whether one-to-one or in large groups. So it is in our encounters with any new fact, phenomena, or experience from which potentially we might learn.⁸

Inquiry learning is an individual act, resulting from something the learner does rather than from something that is done to him. Also, learning is viewed as the product of a learning experience. Learning is controlled by the learner's background, the medium of the learning situation, and the total environment in which the encounter takes place, as well as by the phenomenon that is encountered.

For example, an adolescent Polish-American girl may be taking a course in American history. In a unit on the American labor movement, she becomes curious about the role Polish-American women played in the organization and operation of American labor unions. Since she cannot read Polish, she is unable to analyze many relevant primary sources, such as letters, diaries and Polish-language newspaper accounts. This blunts her motivation to be curious about the subject. She discovers, however, that there are several women in her community who once were members of labor unions and who are able to converse in English. This discovery increases her motivation to become curious about the role Polish-American women played in labor unions. Using a tape recorder, she obtains evidence that allows her to generalize that Polish-American women played a major role in several industrial unions in Chicago during the first quarter of the twentieth century.

The young woman in the illustration has been an active inquirer, that is, the elements of curiosity, motivation, focus

and experience have resulted in learning. What has been learned has been an individual matter, resulting from something the learner has done rather than from something that was done to her. What was learned was also controlled by the learner's background, the medium of the learning situation, and the total environment in which the encounter took place, as well as by the phenomenon that was encountered.

The definition of inquiry formulated by Brown became the basis of the Amherst Project's ideas on education. The Project was concerned about the way youngsters learn and about what sort of teaching strategies could help them to become more efficient learners. The Project was interested in knowing what adolescents are like, what they think about, what they read, what their likes and dislikes are, and what ideas they have of the world around them. The learner's environment--his home, school and community life--become important. For the Amherst Project, then, the learner was extremely important, because whatever curriculum was to be developed had to meet his needs. As a result, the teacher and his students were the only ones who could determine the curriculum.

Inquiry is a way of learning, and anything that promotes inquiry is useful. Teaching strategies that have generally been considered traditional, such as lecturing and textbooks, may be used in ways that will foster inquiry. Brown says that

. . . planning a lecture involves recognition of the fact that what the learner gains from the situation will be a product of the inquiry he brings to it, rather than of what the lecturer says. What the learner hears will be a result of what he is curious about, how and in what ways he is and is not motivated in the situation, what focus he brings to the scene, and his own experience.⁹

Also, a textbook is useful if the learner ". . . needs to find out the facts of some particular sequence of events in order to cope with a problem he is dealing with. . . ." ¹⁰

The teacher has to plan his methods and materials from the point of view of what the learner is expected to be doing in the learning situation. The teacher's thought ". . . involves planning materials as things an inquirer goes to, and thinking of them in terms of why he goes to them, for what, and under what circumstances." ¹¹

A scholar asks questions about a problem, makes a hypothesis, tests the hypothesis with evidence, draws conclusions based on his study, and thus creates for himself a body of knowledge and a set of attitudes. The learner is to act like a scholar, that is, he is to become curious about something, ask questions, hypothesize about the problem, test his hypothesis with evidence, and, finally, develop some insight into the

problem. As this happens, the learner's total experience is expanded. The teacher is an aid in the inquiry process: he presents a problem that will cause the learner to be curious. He then provides for motivation and focus by enabling the learner to understand the problem. This might mean, for example, that the learner will be directed toward readable sources or toward artifacts that relate to the problem. It might also mean that the learner will have to be taught the techniques of oral interviewing and how to use a tape recorder. All of this raises the question of content, and with it Brown's philosophy of history.

Brown assumed that the major purpose for studying history is the personal and moral development of persons. The subjects chosen for the units in the Amherst Project were those that posed universal questions of human relationship. Thus ". . . a study of the impact of the New World's discoveries on the European imagination can be a study of the processes and implications of discovery itself, a study of the Missouri Compromise can be a study of the nature, process and limits of political compromise, and a study of immigration can be a study in the making and change of social values."¹²

Prior to 1964 there had been some talk of designing materials that could be used in a conventional history course that had been chronologically organized. However, when Brown became Director of the Project in 1964, the Amherst Project took a different approach. Brown explains:

The way to understand chronology is not necessarily to take up things in chronological fashion, but to take them up in a fashion that makes clear the significance of the fact that one thing happened before another, while another thing followed. It may be . . . that a student will learn more about chronology and come to appreciate better the fact that the Revolution preceded the Civil War if he spends three weeks piecing together for himself the steps that led to war with Mexico in 1845, perceiving in so doing how critical order-in-time is for understanding.¹³

As a result, in the Amherst Project a student started somewhere and then moved backward and forward in time as his inquiry led him. The important thing was that the learner discover for himself some perplexing problem or dilemma. In dealing with the problem he might be interested in studying how James Polk, Abraham Lincoln, and Woodrow Wilson struggled to find an answer. In doing this the learner realizes that all problems are not capable of solution, and thus discovers, at least partially, what it means to be human. The learner, in short, ". . . comes to appreciate man's necessity to act in the midst of uncertainty, grapples with the moral dimensions of man's behavior, and comprehends more fully the mobility and frailty of the human condition."¹⁴

Along with this humanistic emphasis, history is also inquiry. Brown writes that

. . .students should learn not so much a set of facts. . .as what a fact is, how one comes by it, and how one uses it--that they should learn not so much what historians have held out the past to be as how and why one engages in the study of history anyway, and how and in what way one can expect to learn from it.¹⁵

This does not mean either that the learner has to deal exclusively with primary sources or that he has to recreate all of the knowledge that men have arrived at in the past. Brown states that

The key thing is simply the notion that he will not really be learning--or will not be learning anything worthwhile--unless he is asking. The model of the scholar learning is thus held to be a proper and usable model for what goes on in the classroom.¹⁶

The past is but a collection of data, and sense has to be made of these data by means of questions. Questions help the learner to focus on some data and exclude others. Brown states "It is the question we ask that charges the data with meaning and provides us with an intellectual construct without which the data itself would be formless and pointless."¹⁷ Since each generation is confronted with problems that are different from previous ones, history is constantly being re-written.

The generalizations that appear in any of the standard American history textbooks are the answer to questions posed of the past by numerous historians. It makes little sense to have students master these statements. "It makes far more sense," argues Brown, "that that structure come from the learner's own question than that it come from the unseen question of the textbook writer, or of the historian before him."¹⁸

The question that the learner asks has to be a genuine one, that is, it has to be one that is open-ended, one to which no one knows the final answer. Since all learning begins with something that elicits curiosity in the learner, the student has to be confronted with issues that are real to him. "in coping [with the issue]," writes Brown, "the student goes to situations from which he can infer something universally significant about the human condition which is responsive to the question he is asking."¹⁹

In teaching history, the teacher's task is to identify those questions asked by students which may be profitably pursued in history and to help students find answers to them. The learner has to be shown that history relates to him in some way. Brown explains:

Our experience [in the Amherst Project] thus far seems to suggest that there is no such thing as a 'natural curiosity.' Students are not naturally fascinated by history until they discover that in it they can find the answer to something they want to know. They will not be fundamentally interested in pursuing a historical question unless they see--and this rather quickly--that there is something in it for them.²⁰

The units published by the Amherst Project provide a model for teachers. Each unit is organized for the pursuit of some open-ended, universal question of human behavior, for example, ". . .the nature of reality, the role of values, the role of social myths, the relation between liberty and authority, the uses and limits of power, decision making, the motivation of private and political behavior, and the dynamics of change."²¹ One of these forms the content question of a particular unit and all of the evidence focuses upon it. The learner reconstructs the subject matter of a particular unit from the evidence. However, the set of answers or insights the learner receives as he grapples with the universal question of the unit constitutes the content of the unit. For example, in the unit, What Happened on Lexington Green?,²² the subject matter is the skirmish between British and Colonial troops in 1775. The universal question in the unit deals with how people know anything about an event, past or present. As the learner grapples with the question, his insight into the problem constitutes the content of the unit. The content of a unit is always more important than its subject matter.

The teacher's chief job is not to pass on a fixed body of knowledge, but to facilitate and encourage inquiry. His concern is to organize historical evidence and relate it to students so that they might ask important questions which they might then pursue with the materials. The teacher, in short, has to be aware of each student's frame of reference and his experiences. Along with this, the teacher has to create an atmosphere where he is as much an active learner as is the student. Brown explains:

With [inquiry learning] the teacher can level with the student that the pursuit of truth is tough, that the process of education is lifelong, that at best we who are teachers can only invite him to join us. With it we discover over and over again, despite ourselves, what we all know intellectually to be true but forget too often as educators: that all of us alike are students, all of us alike asking the same question--who and what we are, what the world around us is and how it works, how we relate to it.²³

In other words, the teacher provides the student with a model of the good learner.

An analysis of Brown's philosophical position reveals four questions or problems of concern that remain unresolved. The first problem is the lack of clearly stated curriculum goals. What will happen if a student pursues an Amherst unit? Brown's answer is too vague. He argues that the student will learn "something of what it means to be human"--i.e., he has obtained some understanding of his human condition. But, what does it mean to attain self-understanding, and how will the teacher know that this has happened? The teacher is faced with pressure from various sources to place numerous topics and concerns into the curriculum. Why should he consider some undefined concept of self-understanding?

A second problem involves Brown's organization of curriculum content around the interests of youngsters. It is true that it is easier to learn something that a person is interested in. Yet the question remains: is it desirable--or even possible--to organize curriculum units that are based primarily on student interest? Does not the maker of a curriculum have the obligation to provide experiences that allow learners to explore issues and subjects that are foreign to them in order to further this growth as individuals? Brown's position on this question is not clear to someone who is in the process of designing a curriculum.

Brown admonishes teachers to develop units based on student interests. Yet the Amherst Project's curriculum units focus upon social concerns, philosophical questions, and decision-making processes. For example, Brown wrote a curriculum unit dealing with the issues surrounding the Missouri Compromise of 1820.²⁴ The main focus of the unit involves the use of compromise to solve political problems. The question is raised, is it possible to resolve all political problems by the use of compromise? If there are some problems that do not lend themselves to compromise, how can society deal with these issues? The Amherst Project's units seem to indicate that the curriculum ought to be organized around social problems, philosophical questions, and decision-making processes and that the teacher has the obligation to relate the unit to each individual student. Brown does not, however, sufficiently aid the teacher in relating the unit to his students. The teacher is left with the perplexing advice to select only those units that are of interest to his students.

The third problem is the uncritical acceptance of the idea that intellectual development can best be attained by the use of discovery or inquiry techniques. Brown did not attempt to test this hypothesis in any formal manner. As a result, the failure by teachers to implement successfully the Amherst Project's units was attributed to the failure of the teachers to understand the goals of the Amherst units and the methodology of inquiry learning.

The fourth and last area of concern is the ignoring of affective education. All of the Amherst Project's units involve societal values and contain problems that cause students to reflect upon their own attitudes and values. Furthermore, the units imply that the student will be willing to perform many of the tasks implied in inquiry learning. Yet, Brown does not enunciate how attitudes and values are developed and does not aid the teacher in reaching affective goals.

Since 1964, Brown has influenced American educators. As the director of the Amherst Project, Brown supervised an ambitious experiment aimed at altering the way in which American history was being taught in secondary schools. Currently, Brown is the director of the educational program of the Newberry Library of Chicago. In his new capacity, Brown will continue to affect educators in the years to come. Accordingly, his philosophy of education is worthy of consideration by educational theorists.

FOOTNOTES

1. Richard H. Brown, "History Teaching/Learning and the Communications Revolution," paper presented to the Organization of American Historians Convention, Chicago, Illinois, April 12, 1973, p. 2.
2. Richard H. Brown, "Richard H. Brown Replies," Social Education 31 (November 1967): 584.
3. Brown, "History Teaching/Learning," p. 2.
4. Ibid., p. 3.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
7. Richard H. Brown and Edmund Traverso, "A Guide to the Amherst Approach to Inquiry Learning" (Menlo Park, California: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., n.d.), p. 5.
8. Brown, "History Teaching/Learning," p. 5.
9. Brown and Traverso, "Guide to Amherst Approach," p. 7.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Richard H. Brown, "History as Discovery: An Interim Report on the Amherst Project," address delivered at the 25th Annual Convention of the National School Boards Association, April 1965, reprinted in Teaching the New Social Studies in Secondary Schools: An Inductive Approach, Edwin Fenton, (ed.) (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1966), p. 466.

13. Ibid., p. 447.
14. Brown, "Richard H. Brown Replies," p. 586; see also, Brown and Traverso, "Guide to Amherst Approach," p. 4.
15. Richard H. Brown, "The Historian and New Approaches to History in the Schools," The Teachers College Record 72 (September 1970): 74.
16. Ibid., p. 75.
17. Ibid., p. 76; see also, Brown, "Richard H. Brown Replies," p. 586.
18. Brown, "Historian and New Approaches," p. 76.
19. Ibid., p. 77.
20. Ibid.
21. Brown and Traverso, "Guide to Amherst Approach," p. 5.
22. Peter S. Bennett, What Happened on Lexington Green? An Inquiry into the Nature and Methods of History (Menlo Park, California: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1970).
23. Brown, "Richard H. Brown Replies," p. 585.
24. Richard H. Brown, The Missouri Compromise: Political Statesmanship or Unwise Evasion? (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1964). Dr. Brown's book was one of the earliest of the Amherst units and was published as part of the "New Dimensions in American History" series, edited by Van R. Halsey, Jr.

FREEDOM EDUCATION--TOWARD AN EDUCATIONAL SYNTHESIS
OF DEWEY'S AND SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHIES OF FREEDOM

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Freedom Education is the name for a new educational model that I have been able to contrive on the basis of John Dewey's and Jean Paul Sartre's philosophies of freedom. Sartre wrote almost nothing on education per se, but in this he probably represents major existential writers. Nevertheless, I think that his educational philosophy can be deduced from his basic assumptions. I compare Dewey's and Sartre's philosophies of freedom and education in sections I-IV, and explain what Freedom Education is in section V.

I.

Dewey's and Sartre's writings on freedom are definitive enough to warrant this general observation about them: freedom in the Deweyan sense of the word is not simply the outcome of the human nature of an individual in isolation; it can be understood and realized meaningfully in a situation that involves the individual and his environment in continuous interaction with each other in such a way that an aim is successfully accomplished in experience. Without the cooperation of the environment, Dewey wrote, no individual may hope to realize his intention and become free.¹ On the other hand, Sartrean freedom is a characteristic of humans being in the world. It is an a priori whose nature does not depend on the successful conclusion of an intended aim in experience, or on the cooperation of the environment.² It does depend, however, on the existence of objective conditions, or "existents." As Sartre puts it, "the very order of the existents is indispensable to freedom itself."³ This is so because "the resistance which freedom reveals in the existent, far from being a danger to freedom, results only in enabling it to arise as freedom."⁴

According to both Dewey and Sartre, our actions mirror ourselves, and therefore our freedom.⁵ In spite of the fact that the successful completion of an intended act was not as important to Sartre as it was to Dewey for the realization of our freedom. Sartre, nevertheless, did insist that some kind of active implementation of our intentions and personal choices be objectively manifested.⁶ It seems reasonable to hold that Sartre, in dealing with a certain number of reproaches against existentialism, would declare that existentialism is not "an attempt to discourage man from action since it tells him that there is no hope except in his action, and that the one thing which permits him to have life is the deed. Upon this level, therefore, what we are considering here is an ethic of action and self-commitment."⁷

A point where Dewey and Sartre are in basic disagreement is in the fact that, whereas Dewey asserted that in order to become free we must base our choices on deliberation and scientific intelligence, Sartre wrote that deliberation itself is based on our choosing to deliberate in a certain way, that is, on our choice. Choice is, according to Sartre, "the foundation of all deliberation. . .because. . .a deliberation requires an interpretation in terms of an original choice."⁸ Deliberation must, according to Dewey, precede the actualization of a choice that leads to freedom, whereas to Sartre, deliberation itself is always a matter of choice, that is, of our freedom.

Sartre's emphasis on choice is based on his philosophical ontology of Being and Nothingness. One of his basic philosophical assumptions is that man is condemned to be free because of his constitution as a "for-itself" or reflective consciousness that continuously "nihilates" being or reality by secreting an instrumental nothingness or non-being, in being; it is thus able to imagine an unreal or non-existent state of affairs. The "for-itself" is capable of projecting freely, and then realizing its image in the "in-itself" or reality. Sartre thought that man's ability to tear himself away from the determinism that characterizes being is the reason that man is free. He maintained that man's ability to break away from psychological and environmental determinism is evidenced by such distinctively human characteristics as the ability to imagine an as yet non-existent state of affairs, the ability to choose an altogether new lifestyle to replace the old, or the ability to ask questions.⁹ Sartre's whole philosophy, then, may be seen as an attempt to defend human freedom by criticizing determinism on the basis of a phenomenological ontology. He assumed that determinism and freedom are incompatible, but can coexist as a man being-in-the-world who has the permanent possibility to cause a rupture with himself and with the world. The fact that Sartre saw freedom and determinism as irreconcilable is the reason that he declared that "man is either wholly and forever free, or he is not free at all."¹⁰

Another characteristic of Sartrean ontology is that man is free but lacks the freedom not to be free. Everything that man does is based on his free choice to "live" himself in this or that way. Man is, by definition, forced to choose what he is going to make himself be even if it seems at certain times that man remains allegedly neutral--for not to choose is to choose not to choose.¹¹ Yet the objection may be raised that such determined freedom may not be freedom at all. Let us examine, for instance, Sartre's "aesthetic" or "imaginative" consciousness. He wrote that the artist's imaginative consciousness is intentionally nihilating reality so as to imagine the unreal.¹² But if existential man is condemned to be free, then he has no other choice but to be free. His status as a free being is not a matter of his intention, but of his unavoidable constitution. Contrary to what Sartre claimed, he formulated an a priori description and explanation of how

man will always have to act. When he declared that man is condemned to be free, he was not better off than the behaviorists whom he criticized, who maintain that man is condemned to act according to certain "impersonal" forces.

In his criticism of the indeterminists, Dewey noted that their premises are similar to those of the determinists. "Both have the same premises," he wrote, "the product of inadequate psychological analysis."¹³ They both conceive of an outside cause that determined man's actions regardless of whether they baptize that cause "freedom" or something else. Can it be maintained that Sartre's "for-itself" resembles the so-called "free will" of the indeterminists? In the final analysis the answer must be in the affirmative. As a "for-itself," man is free because he is not determined. The "for-itself," like the free will, is not controlled by the causal relationships of being, because it is not being.

In doing justice to Sartre, however, it must be mentioned that he criticized the theory of free will. Yet his criticism is not a rejection of indeterminism per se, but rather an attack against the old and unsophisticated theory of indeterminism. He wrote that the traditional concept of free will is a power "which sometimes would manifest itself to consciousness and at other times would remain hidden, but which would in any case possess the permanence and the existence 'in-itself' of a property."¹⁴ Not surprisingly, he concluded that "this is precisely what is inadmissible."¹⁵

Nevertheless, consciousness¹⁶ is, according to Sartre, just as undetermined as free will. They are identical in what they can autonomously accomplish. They are different, however, in the way they cause something to happen. Thus Sartre's consciousness is not, like free will, a power influencing being from outside being, but is in being, nihilating being.¹⁷ Its nihilating power is its power of imagination. Without its nihilating power, consciousness would become a "power" or a "cause" similar to that found in being and discovered objectively by consciousness.

II.

If Sartre had maintained that man is not condemned, but that he has the potential to become free by developing an imaginative consciousness which would enable him to choose freely, then he would have allowed for growth in the ability to choose. He would have allowed for education for choice. If man's consciousness has a liberating effect on his choice, then education for freedom through consciousness-raising techniques could have been conceivably justified on Sartrean grounds. As it stands, Sartrean ontology leaves no room for growth in the ability of individuals to choose and become, parallel to the growth in their ability to choose, increasingly liberated. Hence, it leaves no room for the kind of education that will help people grow in this respect. Sartrean

ontology leaves no room for growth because it states that man is free, not as a result of a genetic process that led to his freedom, but by definition: he is a priori condemned to be free.

Nevertheless, if Sartrean freedom is seen as a desirable goal rather than an a priori, as something that can be accomplished gradually rather than by virtue of one's human nature, then it can be easily adopted to an educational model that aims to render students free. Other existential philosophers, like the existential-Marxist Paulo Freire,¹⁸ have recognized clearly the need for educating humans to become conscious of reality so as to develop critical consciousness and become free.

Sartre has not written much on educational theory per se, but that does not mean that educational theorists and practitioners can find very little or nothing of relevance to education in his philosophical writings. For example, he wrote that workers during the 1830's lacked the education and reflection which is necessary for them to imagine a different state of affairs in which they would not be oppressed. Workers of that period saw their suffering as natural and did not rebel against their oppressors. Their misfortunes "are not seen in the clear light of day, and consequently they are integrated by the worker with his being. He suffers without considering his suffering and without conferring value upon it. To suffer and to be are one and the same for him."¹⁹ Sartre saw education in this case as a means toward social liberation through revolutionary change by those who are socially oppressed, but who cannot, due to their undeveloped consciousness, act in such a way as to alleviate their suffering.

III.

Was Dewey justified in considering as largely unimportant the functional role of antecedent, deterministic factors in his examination and definition of freedom? Could it be maintained that if we follow Dewey's model we may succeed in becoming intelligently hedonistic or expedient but not free? Is it possible that we may become actually enslaved by directing our attention to what is in reality going on outside ourselves, by what Sartre called "being"? Or was Dewey, after all, an indeterminist who claimed that man has ways to tear himself away from the enslaving causality found in nature? I shall now attempt to answer this last question.

As mentioned earlier, Dewey rejected a dualistic explanation of how humans choose to act freely at a certain time. He objected to the idea of a free will acting independently as an autonomous power. When the will intervenes between the concrete self, that is, the impulses, habits, and ends, on the one hand, and the deed on the other, then freedom is reduced, according to Dewey, to an "irrationality."²⁰ He concluded that "choice is not a matter of indifference, but an outcome of

character."²¹ He wrote that human character changes due to its continuous readjustment to new environmental conditions.²² Consequently, although a person's choices depend on his character, they will not always be what they have been; they will adapt to the changes in character.²³ Hence, although Dewey rejected a deterministic explanation of how human choice is manifested that is either psychological or environmental in nature,²⁴ he did not reject a deterministic explanation per se; for he formulated a philosophy that considers choice to be the outcome of a combination of psychological and environmental determinism.

Elsewhere, however, Dewey wrote about choice as if it were not determined by a combination of psychological and environmental conditions but by our knowledge about these conditions. For example, he maintained that "knowledge of the conditions under which a choice arises is the same as potential ability to guide the formation of choices intelligently."²⁵ Whence does this ability of choosing to have a certain choice arise, if not from character? There can be no doubt that what Dewey meant here is that when a person has knowledge of the relationship between his choices and their causes he will be able to bring into play those choices that he wants or chooses. Thus, to Dewey, knowledge of objective conditions rather than objective conditions themselves causes a person to choose. In other words, man is able to choose freely on the basis of his knowledge of the causal laws inherent in nature. This Dewey did not state explicitly, but implied in his writings.

It may be argued, however, that, according to Dewey, knowledge itself is a result of universal determinism, such as character and environment; that it is not invested with the power to choose but acts only as a catalyst for choices already made by character. But if that is so, then why is it that Dewey claimed that knowledge of the world is the main reason why a person can choose, rather than simply facilitate the application of choice? Dewey wrote that "if I only knew the connection [between my ideas and their causes] my power over obtaining the ideas I want would be that much increased."²⁶ What Dewey meant here by "knowledge" is awareness of natural causality that results in the person transcending universal determinism to the extent of making his choice of an idea an undetermined choice.²⁷

Dewey's concepts of reflective thinking, prior rehearsal in thought of how one is to act in certain circumstances, and the ability to foresee the consequences of action are functionally similar to Sartre's consciousness and imagination. Dewey did not develop a consistent philosophy of psychological indeterminism. He himself admitted that he failed to develop in a systematic way his underlying psychological principles.²⁸

IV.

Dewey believed that, in contradistinction to Sartre, human nature is not defined a priori, that it is not condemned to be free. He maintained that it is plastic, and therefore educable. He emphasized the need for an education that would instill a scientific attitude in the young. He thought that democratic attitudes will naturally ensue if people were trained from childhood to examine social and ethical problems in the same way that scientists investigate their subject matter, that is, by testing their hypotheses in experience. Thus reflective thinking and practical intelligence become focal points in Dewey's philosophy of education. He advocated the scientific method in education because he thought that through the intelligent manipulation of their desires and environment students will develop habits that will render them free. To Dewey, then, education for freedom meant an ongoing process of growth--a result of his philosophy of freedom, which considers the consequences of intelligent choice as more important to the realization of freedom than the negation of the deterministic causality that is antecedent to human action.

V.

Thus far I have attempted to demonstrate, among other things, that in spite of the fact that Dewey's and Sartre's philosophies of freedom are different in principle they are not as radically different as it might seem at first glance. Thus Dewey, on the one hand, admitted, at least implicitly, that it is possible for humans to transcend reality and be existentially free, while Sartre, on the other, acknowledged the impossibility of the "for-itself" to realize its freedom without taking into proper consideration the "in-itself" or the world of experience. Moreover, both Dewey and Sartre considered action to be a necessary condition toward the realization of freedom.

Can it be maintained that it is possible to adapt both Sartre's and Dewey's philosophies of freedom to a single educational ideal when, in fact, they are teleologically antagonistic? I think it is possible to do so because they suggest ways of enriching and expanding rather than impoverishing the potential for freedom and knowledge which humans can enjoy. As thesis and antithesis they point to each other's weaknesses. Thus they suggest a new synthesis to those who will be able to recognize it.

Freedom Education is an educational synthesis of this sort. It consists of two kinds of educational ideals and practices, "education for objective consciousness" and "consciousness education." Through education for objective consciousness educators can help students become aware of causal relationships in themselves (for example, in their bodies) and in their environment. Education for objective consciousness may be seen as Dewey's contribution to Freedom Education.

Through consciousness education educators can help students become conscious of themselves as choosers. Consciousness education may be seen as Sartre's contribution to Freedom Education. Education that leads to both knowledge and freedom is probably at its maximum effectiveness when it becomes both education for objective consciousness and consciousness education--in other words, when it becomes Freedom Education. It seems to me that neither education for objective consciousness nor consciousness education alone can provide the means for rendering students both knowledgeable and free. Each is a necessary but not a sufficient condition.

Thus, on the one hand, consciousness education (Sartre's contribution) may enable students to see themselves as choosers, but unless students have correct knowledge of relevant laws of causality in experience, self-defeatism will inevitably result. Students who have had consciousness education but not education for objective consciousness will be unable, most of the time, to realize their choices in experience, since they will have relatively insufficient knowledge of objective circumstances to foresee the consequences of their actions. Consequently, they may eventually abandon any notion they may have acquired which tells them that they are choosers, because their actions will rarely, and then only accidentally, come to fruition in experience. Eventually they may become disappointed and non-assertive rather than optimistic and creative; or they may become quixotic, thinking that they can actualize their choices even though they are not able to do so.

On the other hand, students who have had education for objective consciousness (Dewey's contribution) but not consciousness education may become able to find ways of satisfying their needs by foreseeing the consequences of their actions in experience. But they will probably be unable to transcend the process of interaction between themselves and the world so as to see themselves as the ones who initially chose to act on their needs, who chose to live themselves in a certain way. Unless they become aware of themselves as choosers, as the ones on whose choice deliberation itself depends, they will not become free. The above proposition is obviously true according to the Sartrean philosophy of freedom, and is one of the goals of consciousness education.

Through Freedom Education students will become able to recognize the presence and structure of an obstacle to the realization of their freedom, and will take whatever steps may be necessary to overcome it. They will learn about the world in cooperation with each other so as to realize their choices. Thus Freedom Education includes the scientific method of learning. Chances that students who have been educated according to the Freedom Education model will be led to disillusionment and despair are very close to zero, because they will have learned how to realize their choices and fulfill their needs. The scientific method of learning is one of the most important aims in Dewey's philosophies of freedom and education, and is one of the goals of education for objec-

tive consciousness. The successful conclusion of choice in experience is as important to Freedom Education as is consciousness of self as chooser. Freedom Education means that once students have chosen to learn about the world they have realized that they have also taken the responsibility to learn in a scientific way. They cannot arbitrarily choose to deny the scientifically arrived at findings of others whenever these findings are not in harmony with their own beliefs, for they have already chosen to be scientific. Yet it also enables students to realize that it is they who chose to be scientific in the first place, that deliberation itself depends on their choice, that is, on their freedom. They will become capable of transcending reality and seeing themselves as beings possessed with the ability to imagine, to tear themselves away from being, that is, to be free. They can become conscious of themselves as choosers by participating in discussions about themselves. For example, they can investigate something which they have created; each student will thus become able to listen to others talk about their creations and to themselves about the creations of others. They may be led, in this way, to wider psychosocial issues that concern them directly. They will eventually decode and demythologize at least some of the themes which they might have unconsciously accepted as being true, or inevitable, or unchangeable.

Freedom Education is, of course, an ideal. And as is often the case with ideals, we can succeed in realizing it only partially. Nevertheless, I trust that I have amply demonstrated that Freedom Education is largely realizable, and that it is at least not impossible. In conclusion, I trust that if certain educators would like to help their students become both well educated and free, then Freedom Education presents them with an appropriate model for the realization of their goal.

FOOTNOTES

1. Dewey, "Freedom and Responsibility," The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, 5 vols, Jo Ann Boydston, General Editor (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967-72), 4: 337-50.
The following list of Dewey's works on freedom is arranged chronologically, and is representative of Dewey's continuous and sincere interest in the problem of freedom:
1) "The Idea of Freedom," The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, 5 vols, Jo Ann Boydston, General Editor (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967-72), 3 (1889-1892): 340-44; 2) "Freedom and Responsibility," Early Works, 4 (1893-1894): 337-50; 3) "What Is Freedom?" Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1922) reproduced in John Dewey on Education, ed. Reginald D. Archambault (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 81-88; "Philosophies of Freedom," published in 1928 in Freedom in the Modern World, ed. Horace M. Kallen (New York: Coward-McCann, 1928), pp. 236-271; Freedom and Culture

(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939), esp. "The Human Uses of Freedom," in ibid., and reproduced in John Dewey, ed. Irwin Edman (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), pp. 238-296; "Liberty and Social Control," Problems of Men (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), pp. 111-125.

2. Sartre, "Being and Doing: Freedom," Being and Nothingness, tr. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), pp. 433-556.
Sartre devoted more attention to the problem of freedom in his major work, Being and Nothingness, than to any other single subject. His chapter on freedom is more voluminous than any other. He laid the psychological basis for his conception of freedom in an earlier work (1940), The Psychology of Imagination, tr. Wade Baskin, and reproduced, in part, in Of Human Freedom, ed. W. Baskin (New York: Philosophical Library, 1966), pp. 7-31. In his Existentialism Is a Humanism (1947), tr. Philip Mairet and reproduced in Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre, ed. Walter Kaufmann (Cleveland, Ohio: The World Publishing Co., 1956), pp. 287-311, Sartre defended his theory of freedom in easier to understand but equally forceful ways.
3. Being and Nothingness, p. 483.
4. Ibid.
5. Dewey, Early Works, 4: 348; Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 439.
6. "It is necessary," Sartre wrote, "to note that the choice . . .supposes a commencement of realization in order that the choice may be distinguished from the dream and the wish." Being and Nothingness, p. 483.
7. Existentialism Is a Humanism, in Kaufmann, p. 302.
8. Being and Nothingness, pp. 461-462.
9. The Psychology of Imagination; change in lifestyle: Being and Nothingness, pp. 475-476; questioning: ibid., p. 23.
10. Being and Nothingness, p. 441.
11. Ibid., p. 479.
12. The Psychology of Imagination, in Baskin, p. 23.
13. "Freedom and Responsibility," Early Works, 4: 349. Italics in the original.
14. Being and Nothingness, p. 444.
15. Ibid.

16. Henceforth, I will use the term "consciousness" with the understanding that it refers to the reflective type of consciousness.
17. Ibid.
18. Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Seabury Press, 1970); Education for Critical Consciousness (New York: Seabury Press, 1973).
19. Being and Nothingness, p. 435. Italics in the original.
20. "Freedom and Responsibility," Early Works, 4: 345.
21. "The Idea of Freedom," Early Works, 3: 342.
22. Ibid., p. 343.
23. Ibid.
24. See Dewey's criticism of determinist and indeterminist theories in "Determinist and Indeterminist Theories," Early Works, 4: 344-350.
25. "Philosophies of Freedom," in Kallen, p. 267.
26. Ibid.
27. Likewise, Dewey wrote that "knowledge of the facts does not entail conformity and acquiescence. The contrary is the case. Perception of things as they are is but a stage in the process of making them different. . . . It is the part of intelligence to tell when to use the fact to conform and perpetuate, and when to use it to vary conditions and consequences. . . . Intelligent action is not concerned with the bare consequences of the thing known, but with consequences to be brought into existence by action conditioned on the knowledge." Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Henry Holt, 1922), pp. 298-299. Italics in the original.
28. Dewey admitted "I have failed to develop in a systematic way my underlying psychological principles," in "Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder," in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of John Dewey (Northwestern University Press, 1939), quoted in Richard J. Bernstein, John Dewey (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966), pp. 176-177.

THE RENEWAL OF DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION: THE NEED FOR DISINTERESTED CRITICISM¹

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Since the late 1960's, Cassandra-like prophets have predicted the coming demise of democratic processes in American civilization. The debacles of Viet Nam and Watergate have been diagnosed as symptoms of the malaise of a declining public morality. Evidence of domestic spying and espionage is a sign of governmental disregard of individual rights to privacy. These and other events provide evidence that democratic values are in jeopardy. Throughout the United States laymen and professional educators alike have called upon the schools to cultivate a renewal of public morality. But how is this revitalizing of the public conscience to be done? Some say that we need courses on law and the legal system. Others urge the preaching of old-fashioned patriotic values. And still others recommend courses in values clarification. This paper argues that American educators need to address themselves to questions of public morality. It is argued further that such a value-laden education should be based on the democratic process that is a product of the American historical experience. Finally, a case is made that disinterested participation in the democratic process is a desirable goal and that schools can advance such participation by acting as social and political critics.

Since many eloquent statesmen have commented on the nature of democratic values, it is no easy task to approach the topic. It is difficult to add to the ideas of such eloquent spokesmen for democratic values as John Stuart Mill and John Dewey. During a time when there is much doubt about the efficacy of the democratic ethic, it is useful to re-examine some of the values of the democratic heritage that relate to education for democracy.

The leaders of the English Glorious Revolution of 1688, the American Revolution of 1776, and the French Revolution of 1789 developed the basic concepts about the rights of man which clearly expressed democratic values. These revolutionary statements of the eighteenth century asserted that each individual possesses rights to life, liberty, and property. As they developed, these basic assertions came to mean that every person has the right to freedom of expression in the spoken and written word. Freedom of ideas--intellectual and academic freedom--is not merely the right to hold ideas, but is also the right to express them. Freedom of the press, speech, assembly and religion are well known products of the revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries. These values,

certainly, would form the core of a democratic education that proclaims the individual dignity of every man, woman, and child. The individual person is a base of these freedoms. Although society, government, and institutions may recognize and seek to extend these basic rights, they belong to the man, woman, and child as a human being, a person, an individual.

At the outset, it should be asserted that the core of democratic values and an education based upon it should focus on and should prize the individual as a unique person who is worthy in his own right. Every person has potentialities that are intrinsically valuable private possessions. Every person also has potentialities that are worth developing because they are socially valuable.

It is obvious that a democratic educational commitment must resist threats to the individual and his freedom. Political tyrants, dogmatists, and absolutists--the extremists of the political left and right--who seek to end individual freedoms obviously must be opposed. The brutality and coercion of twentieth-century totalitarianism is an overt threat to the democratic ethic.

The forces of mass society also subtly erode individual freedom. Modernity has brought with it much that has benefited human beings. Mass production, arising from the wedding of science and technology, has made it possible efficiently to produce goods in great abundance, and to place them within the reach of vast numbers of the population. Mass media enable news events and entertainment to reach great numbers via the newspaper, radio, motion picture, and television. While this modernization of production and communication has benefited humanity, the "mass-ness" of the new technology also has posed tremendous problems for the cultivation and encouragement of individuality.

Cultural, social, political and educational institutions--such as the media and schools themselves--have become geared to the "mass-ness" of society. They are oriented to what is a mythical "average" person. While in reality there is no average person, mass production, communication, and education are oriented to such a mythical entity. As a result of opinion polls or ratings, programming is oriented to the average mass person. The greater the orientation on the average, the fewer the opportunities to exercise and cultivate individuality and uniqueness.

Teachers in schools have always had the problem of dealing with the student as an individual in the group context. While much has been written about the cultivation of individual differences and the needs and interests of the individual learner, teachers also have had to deal with the group. What interests the group may not interest the individual. What the particular individual needs and wants may not be the same as what the group needs or wants. To reconcile

individual with the group is a continuing social and political problem of the first magnitude. It is a problem that has no final or definite solution but will be part of the tension of life as long as human beings live on this planet.

If the tension between the individual and the mass society is a perennial problem, one may ask, "Why mention it? Why deal with it when there are no permanent solutions?" A perennial problem is one that is worthy of thought and action at any time. What is important for democratic values and democratic education is that no individual should ever be sacrificed to the group--or become the victim of the group. Most importantly, it is paramount to guard against the tendency to think of the group or of the society as having a nature or a life of its own that is apart from the individual persons who are its members. The "group will," the "average," or the "representative sample" often mask the coercion of the individual person. The democratic educator should give priority to the individual, who is always prior to the group and prior to the society.

Although persons are prior to the group, they are also social beings. Human potentialities are developed within the group or social context. For example, freedom of expression has added meaning when there are others to hear a person's speech. The individual is not an isolate in either the political or social sense. Neither anarchy nor irresponsible selfish egotism democracy is, rather, a complex of ideas, values, and procedures that enables and encourages the individual to live in a society of peers. That political despotism or dictatorship is coercive of the individual is well known. Just as it is necessary to oppose political tyrants, so is it necessary to oppose the cult of the mass or the average that scales each individual down to one size, one dimension, and one attitude.

Decision-making in a democratic society involves a search for processes that unite the individual and the society. In reaching decisions in a social context, individuals unite with their peers and form either majorities or minorities on specific issues. If decision-making means proffering solutions to problems, it can be assumed that as the problems change so will the composition of majorities and minorities. In other words, in a democratic setting, majorities and minorities will be shifting, altering, changing. There will be neither a permanent majority nor a permanent minority.

In considering the questions of democratic values and democratic education, the attitudes that one has to majorities and minorities are of crucial importance. It has been indicated that the majorities and minorities being discussed are issue-oriented, procedural, and temporary. The working assumption is that an individual is never permanently in a decision-making majority or in a minority. In developing democratic attitudes and values, it is important that individuals have the experience of being at certain times in the majority and

at other times in the minority. It is to be hoped that the change from one status to another will engender an understanding of these procedural roles, these temporary groupings, and an openness to opposition.

Although the actual procedure in determining a majority or a minority is basically a mathematical process of counting individuals, the important matter is the attitudes that are relevant to being a member of a majority or a minority. It is from the matter of attitudes that the raw materials of an education for democratic values emerges. The sense of participation in the process of forming a majority or a minority is a value that needs cultivation in democratic education. Democracy requires that those who are part of the political commonwealth participate in its decisions. Although personal and group interests motivate and determine the degree of participation, the democratic person is a participant in some issue or other at some time or other. Above all, the individual should desire to participate in decisions that pertain to the process itself. What is called for are participants who cherish and value a process of decision-making through elective and representative institutions.

One of the difficulties in concretizing the values of a democratic education is that it is a process that is being cherished. The process is based on an ideal of self-government. This ideal has had its heroic representatives in the American historical experience--there have been Jeffersons, Lincolns, Wilsons, to name only a few exemplars. However, it is not a single person--heroic or otherwise--that is being cherished or valued. It is a process. While the process is dynamic, it may not be dramatic. When the democratic process is most pervasive, it is common-place, everyday, and justifiably routine.

American political life has become increasingly formalized. The political structure exists in a formal or structural way but often not in a mode that penetrates to the informal and generalized life of the American people. Reserved for state occasions, the values associated with participation in the democratic political processes have tended to become external, rhetorical, and unreal. The educational problem becomes that of arresting the drift between the formal expression of democratic values and the issues of ordinary life. The goal of an education for democratic values is to make the process part of life itself. Although adherence to the democratic process should be habitual, it also must be reflective, intelligent, and operational. National calamities such as Watergate occur when the process is proclaimed formally but not practiced operationally. When loyalty to a man or to power itself replaces commitment to the procedure, then the democratic process has been replaced by another kind of value which is determined solely by people, their personalities, and their offices.

A second characteristic of the democratic process that involves the forming of majorities and minorities is that the process be open and free of violence. Violence refers to the coercion of individuals by brute force, economic pressures, or psychological manipulation. Although we certainly want to win the cause or the issue in which we believe and will seek to persuade others to join us in our advocacy, the democratic process requires us to respect the persons and dignity of our opponents. The working out of decisions should be procedural, peaceful, and non-violent. Although the meaning of non-violent decision-making ought to be clear, recent rhetoric--especially that of the late 1960's--has confused this meaning. Simply stated, democratic non-violence means that I do no injury to my opponent's body, mind, or rights as a person. But I am free and indeed obligated to challenge ideas and policies with which I disagree.

There are those who claim that violence is justified because we live in a violent society. Following a revived but crude anarchism or Marxism, proponents of violence argue that the state is violent since it coerces. They also argue that institutions, be they the large business corporations, or large universities, are merely agencies or arms of a coercive state and therefore ought to be destroyed. Frequently, the advocates of the theory and, unfortunately, the practice of violence for political or social goals seek confrontation that leads to polarization of individuals into irreconcilable groups. The practitioners of violence are often banal, irrational, or potential despots who want their turn at absolute power. They feel that the democratic processes are either too slow or, even worse, merely an ideological smokescreen for vested interests. It is a truism that violence spawns further violence. The tensions and temperament of violent persons tend to destroy deliberative processes. In a polarized society, a majority or a minority that is in opposition becomes a group to be destroyed.

Non-violent participation in democracy means neither apathy nor pacifism. Once a decision is made by those who use the democratic process, the state becomes an agency of enforcement. Those who violate the decisions of representative government are indeed coerced by the police power of the state. The man who would recklessly drive at high speed through a school crossing is being coerced by the power of the state which represents the majority's desire to protect the safety and welfare of its children.

Another kind of violence which is more subtle and less overt but probably more pernicious to the process is that practiced by those who do violence to the democratic process by subverting it by "dirty tricks," "cover-ups," machinations, subterfuge, or the management of the process so that it no longer functions in a truly representative way. Here, we have the sinister workings of "Watergate" to undermine the process for the sake of a person, for power, or for profit. Here is the danger of using the appearance of democracy to subvert the process itself.

The degree to which a society is reflective, open, tolerant, and democratic is shown by how it treats its minorities. The twentieth century has been the era of genocide, persecution, and extermination of minorities. A democratic society is rich in its diversities--in the different ideas, attitudes, and values of its members. A clear value of democracy is the cherishing of diversities and the willingness to encourage uniqueness. To be in the minority is to be different from the majority. The more alternatives in society, the greater will be the opportunities of the society.

The United States, like all other political societies, rests upon consensus or a body of shared ideas, beliefs, and values. Consensus is the social, political, intellectual mortar that underlies all viable societies. It is an agreement about what is to be accepted and adhered to by those who reside, participate, and who share in the society. Consensus implies agreement, and agreement brings with it a high degree of conformity. The area of consensus may be broad and general or it may be specific and extremely definitive. Societies based on a very general or broad consensus will accept, encourage, and entertain many alternatives. Societies resting on a specific consensus will limit the possibilities or alternatives that are available to their members.

Education, especially in the organized sense of schooling, is a means by which the values inherent in consensus are transmitted from generation to generation. If the area of consensus is broad and general, the values transmitted by the school will also be broad and general and contain a variety of alternatives and choices. If the body of values contained in the consensus is specific, definitive, and precisely described, then the value core transmitted by the school will be narrowly prescribed.

Several issues present themselves for further discussion. Does consensus pose limits on human freedom, particularly in the social, political, and educational realm? Are there limits compatible with a conception of democratic life and education? To respond, it should be recognized that all societies rest on a consensus that expresses what its members agree to and that with which they disagree. Certain elements or aspects of the consensus are at the customary or informal level; other elements in the consensus are enacted more formally into law. A society maintains itself by coercing to some degree its members by setting limits on their behavior. Historically or sociologically, one cannot find an example of a society without some degree of consensus or agreement.

A major part of education for American democracy, or for political socialization in American society, is based on the transmission and examination of the national consensus. However, the processes involved in the consensus are the means by which the consensus itself may be re-examined and reshaped in its particulars. This re-examination and reshaping is a continual process that makes the consensus dynamic and change-

able. In this reconstruction the key elements are (1) respect for the worth of the individual; (2) the freedom of the society to redefine itself; and (3) the use of the democratic process. In light of these democratic values, the areas of basic agreement are shaped, patterned, and redefined. The re-examination and reconstruction of the democratic heritage poses several problems for both the individual and society. There are critics who assert that the real locus of power in American society is no longer the individual but is the special interest group. On the other hand, there are critics who charge that the democratic process has become so encumbered by bureaucracy and special interests that only sweeping revolutionary change can remedy the atrophy of American political life.

In recent years, leading commentators on modern American political life have referred to the American polity as composed of conflicting special interest groups. According to interest group theory, individuals form alliances with those who share their special interests to organize a "pressure group" which seeks to achieve the group's special goals. It is obvious that political decision-making is influenced and affected by special interest groups. For example, the AFL-CIO as the major labor union in the United States influences policy and legislation. The National Education Association expresses the special interests of teachers, administrators, and other professional educators in the United States. The American Medical Association represents the interests of physicians and surgeons. These and many other interest groups work to elect legislators, to influence public opinion, and to secure the passage of legislation that will benefit their special causes.

An education that seeks to cultivate civic or political competency will examine the role of interest groups in American political life. It will have to deal with the nature, purposes, functions, and effects of such interest groups so that students can arrive at an accurate understanding of interest group politics. As they prepare for careers, many students will be led from their economic occupations to join special interest groups.

In considering the moral and ethical dimension of participation in American political life, the evaluation of the special interest group poses a serious issue. Individuals do have special interests that are economic, aesthetic, social, recreational, and religious. In a mass society, it is especially difficult for the lone individual to protect and to extend his interests. Membership in groups makes it possible for associations of individuals to organize, to fund, and to publicize their special political programs. The existence of special interest groups is not only a political reality but it is a right that is considered valuable in American political life.

In view of the existence of diverse and conflicting special interest groups, it is necessary to consider the questions of national consensus and individual freedom. Large and highly organized special interest groups make it difficult, if

not impossible, for the individual voice to be heard in a society that is dominated by huge corporations, large trade unions, highly specialized professional organizations, and a system of mass communication. To exercise even a limited degree of power, the individual needs to join with others, pay his dues, and hope that his special interest group will outmaneuver other groups that are pursuing diverse and often conflicting goals.

In a polity composed of special interest groups, what is to be the base of consensus? Is consensus to be found in the bureaucracy of federal regulatory agencies that seek to adjudicate disputes between corporate interest groups? Is consensus to be found in Machiavellian-like strategies that establish guidelines for the buying and selling of influence? Or is consensus to be established by the largest of the pressure groups through a monopoly of power resting on interlocking corporate entities? In any of these approaches, the individual and his rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are likely to be crushed. What will be suggested later in this paper is that there is a value in being temporarily disinterested on specific issues. Individuals who are interested in the democratic process but intelligently disinterested in the special interest issue represent an alternative to a society that is dominated exclusively by special interests. Before examining the value of the disinterested participant, still another trend will be examined in terms of education for political participation in American life.

During the days of rapid-fire student activism on the college campuses of the late 1960's, the slogan was often heard, "If you are not part of the solution, then you are part of the problem." In some ways, this slogan was a refreshing challenge to the status quo, to the domination of American political life by special-interest groups, and to the inertia of snail-like committees and bureaucracies. It was a call for a reassertion of individual initiative and reform. While the slogan conveyed these beneficent meanings, it also carried with it a sense of quick, immediate, and often simplistic commitment to causes. Some of these causes were broad and general, such as ending the war in Viet Nam, eradicating poverty, ending racial and sexual discrimination, and eliminating environmental pollution. At other times, the same slogan was used to disguise small and narrow causes that expressed students' special interests, such as the ending of parietal hours, the elimination of grades, or the deletion of certain required courses from the curriculum. Often what characterized the advocates of these various causes, both large and small, was the pursuit of ends without the requisite means. Even more dangerous was the separation of means from ends. Seizing a campus building, interrupting a class, or the use of overt violence was regarded as a necessary means to obtaining a desired end. The use of undemocratic and violent means, however, jeopardized the entire process of academic freedom of the teacher to teach and of the learner to learn.

For those who never actually seized a building or occupied a dean's office or disrupted a class, the spirit of the slogan, "If you are not part of the solution, you are part of the problem," nevertheless carried a sense of urgency to be immediately committed in a passionate way to some particular cause or to a whole series of related or even unrelated causes. The need to be always committed to some cause induced a state of continual mobilization of energy and force that often ran counter to the values of both a liberating education and to the operation of democratic procedures.

The sense of urgent commitment to a cause is often a sign of the "true believer" who is single minded in pursuit of a goal and who refuses to recognize, understand, and appreciate opposing viewpoints and concerns. This mental singularity of purpose erodes and destroys a sense of objectivity that allows one to examine an issue with a sense of perspective. It was this distrust of perspective that nourished the anti-historical orientation of many of those who followed the slogan of urgent commitment to action. With the clamor for immediate action, the disinterested and objective teacher, professor, and student became an enemy to be harassed and to be pressured.

It is this writer's contention that there is a keen educational and political value in being occasionally disinterested in special interests and in specific causes. It is argued that disinterest is a value that ought to be cultivated in our formal institutions of learning and also by our informal educational agencies.

Since "disinterested" has been unfortunately confused with "uninterested," some discussion of the terms "disinterested" and "disinterested participant" is needed. The American College Dictionary defines "disinterested" as an adjective that means "unbiased by personal interest or advantage; not influenced by selfish motives." In contrasting "disinterested" with the term "uninterested," the Dictionary further advises that "disinterestedness" stresses a "lack of prejudice or of selfish interests" while "uninterested suggests aloofness and indifference."

What would it mean to be a "disinterested" participant in the American political process? And, what might be the educational implications of disinterested participation? Relying on a strict dictionary definition, the disinterested participant would not be uninterested in the democratic political process. Nor would he or she be aloof from it or apathetic about it. Unlike the member of the special interest group, the disinterested participant would not have selfish motives, nor would he or she be seeking to achieve special goals or advantages. Unlike the "true believer" pursuing a commitment to a cause, the disinterested participant would be involved but not in a prejudiced or biased way. To be disinterested implies having a sense of perspective that contributes to an objective evaluation of an issue or a cause.

Earlier it was stated that the democratic process is one that causes individuals sometimes to be in the majority and sometimes in the minority on a specific issue. Being a member of either the majority or the minority was described as a temporary state of affairs. In much the same manner, being disinterested is also a temporary state of mind. As members of special interest groups, we can be interested in achieving our special interest but disinterested about the special interests of others. At other times we will find ourselves deeply committed to particular causes but not to all causes. Disinterested participation means that at certain times we will be objective and will also expect others to be disinterested about interests or causes that affect us. As an individual, I can be disinterested and can investigate, decide, and act objectively--at least at certain times. I can also expect others to act in a like-minded fashion on issues that do not affect them in an urgent or immediate way.

The political theory of John Stuart Mill aptly recommends the value of disinterested participation in modern society. In his Dissertations and Discussions, written in 1867, Mill addressed himself to many of the questions raised in this paper. Moving from Benthamite Utilitarianism, Mill remained a staunch defender of individual freedom and of representative government. He feared that a mass society could reduce individualism to a state of cow-like mass conformity in which uniqueness had been ground down by the supremacy of the average. He also feared that special interests, if unguided by the perspective of reason, could destroy the operations of genuinely representative government. A brief examination of certain of Mill's ideas will lend some historical and philosophical support to the argument for disinterested participation in the democratic process.

For Mill, education was to act as the great solvent of a democratic society. Educated persons, he reasoned, would be concerned with general rather than with special class interests. If educated persons could persuade enough of those supporting special interest claims to support proposals that would advance social progress, then special interests would be subordinated to the common good.² Mill saw the scholar as having a special role in political life in preparing and advancing legislation that was in the public interest.

For Mill, the good society was one that advanced individual freedom in as many directions as possible. His well-known essay On Liberty expresses the conviction that freedom of thought and expression will advance human progress.³ While it is obviously necessary to oppose the authoritarianism of political tyrants, it is equally important to guard against the tyranny of the majority--that is, to guard against the tendency of society to impose conventional ideas and practices on all of its members.

Directly stated, Mill's argument in On Liberty was that: (1) man is a rational being who is interested in advancing his

welfare; (2) the individual's welfare is accompanied by advancing the public good; (3) new ideas advance both personal and public progress; (4) new ideas are derived from individuals and from members of minorities; (5) in a climate of freedom of thought and opinion, alternative ideas emerge and enter into competition with each other; (6) from the competition of ideas, truth will emerge; (7) the good polity will be a society that cherishes the freedom of the individuals who are its members.

The educational implications of Mill's stress on individual freedom are clear. The learner is primarily an individual who has his own interests, needs, values, and, most importantly, his own ideas. Attention constantly needs to be focused on the individual dignity of the learner who possesses his own unique potentialities to achieve fulfillment as a human being. In a mass society, this call for the preservation of individuality elicits numerous educational prescriptions. American educational institutions, like other social institutions, have grown large, complex, and bureaucratic. Their size and complexity have produced a numbing effect on individuality. In corporate education, as well as in corporate society, there is the danger that in the quest for efficient programming of instruction the individual student will have his behavior so modified that all uniqueness is eliminated from his character. When the individual is lost in the mass and becomes a blur in the faceless crowd, he is reduced to an impersonal statistic. He becomes subject to what Mill would have called the conformity of the mass. In the case of American education, the danger to individuality comes also from the pressures to quantify and to standardize all modes of human individuality and expression. Following from Mill's arguments, one plea becomes apparent--the individual is and must remain paramount to the mass. If large and massive institutions bring about a condition of educational conformity and oppressive impersonality, then they must be redesigned to suit the needs of the individual rather than having the individual reduced to meet institutional specification.

An educational institution which encourages the development and articulation of diverse ideas is one in which teachers are free to teach and learners are free to learn. As freedom in the larger society is jeopardized by coercion, bureaucracy, authoritarianism, violence, conformity, and anarchy, so educational freedom is limited in the school.

Mill's arguments in On Liberty support the thesis that it is possible and desirable to frame social, political, and educational policies that advance both the individual and the social interest. For the kind of society urged by Mill, the consensus needed would be one that recognizes the value of individual freedom of thought and expression and that encourages disinterested examination and action on the issues facing the society. The kind of individualism asserted by Mill looks beyond its special interests to social welfare and progress.⁴

An education designed to cultivate democratic citizenship, knowledge, and values involves elements of both continuity and renewal in that it seeks to perpetuate the democratic heritage and to renew it by engaging students in the process of reflective, disinterested inquiry. As agencies of both continuity and renewal, schools have a role to play that can be exercised by few other institutions. That role is to act as a critic of society, of other institutions, of politics, and of the quality of human experience.

First of all, let us consider why schools make good agencies of social and political criticism. It should be recognized that there are many forces at work to undermine the critical role of schools or to reduce the schools to sounding boards for special interest propaganda. The continuing quest for and the safeguarding of the freedoms of teaching and learning, or academic freedom, is a response to secure and protect the school's right and obligation to act as social critic.

Self and social criticism are means of examining oneself and also of examining one's society. Criticism is a way of evaluating or appraising. It examines the nature of the worth of the goals or objectives that guide policy. It seeks to ascertain if procedures are workable in attaining goals. Most importantly, examination is a way of seeing if there is consistency between means and ends. It also reveals consistency or inconsistency between abstract goals and ethics and the immediate policy required to implement them in practical situations. Criticism is a means of pointing out flaws and weaknesses. When used constructively, criticism is a way of encouraging the growth and development of that which is being examined.

Part of the educative process as it affects growth and development is a corrective or critical function. Teachers correct spelling mistakes; they correct errors in arithmetic; they try to correct anti-social or self-destructive behavior in students. While correction based on criticism is a part of schooling, it is not the only part. Nevertheless, it is an element in the process of critical education.

In much the same way that criticism and correction are part of the educative process that relates to individuals, schools as social institutions have a role to play in social criticism. Social criticism is broadly construed to mean the criticism of political, cultural, and educational institutions and processes. Schools are uniquely fitted to act as critics because whenever teaching and learning deals with values, the evaluation process becomes judgmental and critical.

The transmission of the democratic cultural heritage and its renewal in the face of problems both continue the heritage and also renew it by reshaping it. Both the process of transmission and of renewal involve selection; intelligent selection is based on judgment or evaluation which rests on criticism.

It has been argued that examination of the democratic heritage reveals certain continuing and substantial elements that define and identify it. The criteria of judgment of society and its institutions then come from this heritage. In the solution of problems these democratic elements are carried into the problem-solving situation and continue as part of the cultural heritage.

When one speaks of academic criticism, one refers to the criticism that comes from possessing knowledge. It is argued here that schools should be places where criticism is carried on in the light of knowledge derived from disciplined inquiry. It is contended that a democratic education should encourage criticism or evaluation of all kinds for the purpose of extending personal and social freedom. As agencies for the transmission and renewal of the heritage, schools also have the responsibility to be critics of that heritage.

In the historical examination of the democratic cultural heritage, when schools act as agents of criticism, they should do so with a sense of perspective. Following the interpretations of history, they exercise their critical role with a sense of distance from the immediate temporal event.

The critical role to be played by the school does not involve the deliberate adoption of a platform for immediate reform or for programmatic socio-political change. Specifically, schools should avoid being reduced to sounding-boards for political propaganda that call for immediate action, as often occurred in the late 1960's. The danger of unreflective criticism is that it leads to the use of the slogan and the non-negotiable demand rather than to disinterested participation in the democratic process.

At the same time that a perspective or a distance is required for the employment of social criticism, this distance cannot become so great as to make criticism merely a formal academic exercise. The kind of critic that continually separates judgment from action tends to become a dilettante or agnostic who may be adept at criticism as an intellectual exercise but who often separates decision-making from the act of evaluation. The kind of critical stance recommended is one that is both of an ethical and of a constructive nature. It is ethical in that it values the principles derived from and embodied in the democratic heritage. It is constructive in that it works for renewal in an informed and deliberate manner that is guided by disciplined knowledge.

The function of schools as social critics is both a bold and a delicate task. It is bold because it may challenge prevalent views, biases, and positions of dominant groups. It is delicate because schools are fragile institutions. The fragility of the school as a social critic is safeguarded when criticism is done with the authority that comes from disciplined inquiry based upon knowledge.

FOOTNOTES

1. This paper is part of a manuscript that the author is preparing on civic education.
2. J. Salwyn Shapiro, Liberalism and the Challenge of Fascism (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1949), p. 267.
3. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty, and Representative Government (London: Everyman's Library, 1914).
4. Francis W. Garforth, ed., John Stuart Mill on Education (New York: Teachers College Press, 1971), p. 11.

JOHN LANCASTER SPALDING: IDEALIST OR PRAGMATIST?

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John Lancaster Spalding was the acknowledged leader of the American Catholic educational community from the time he became Bishop of Peoria in 1877 until he suffered a serious stroke in 1905. He gave leadership to the systemization of Catholic parochial education at the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore and was the author (as much as anyone could be called the author) of the Baltimore Catechism, the classic textbook of American Catholic religious education. He was also the founder of the Catholic University of America, which he intended to be the capstone of the meritocratic system of education for Catholics, and the founder of one of the first central Catholic high schools (Spalding Institute, Peoria).

Spalding also was active in secular education. He wrote eighteen books, most of them dealing with education and most of them published by a Protestant publisher (A. C. McClurg & Co., Chicago). He was a familiar figure at N.E.A. meetings and was a close friend of many national figures. Nicholas Murray Butler saw to it that Spalding got one of the first honorary doctorates from Columbia after Butler became president. Theodore Roosevelt appointed Spalding to a commission to settle the Anthracite Coal Strike and later commended his work on that commission as one of the greatest assistances given him during his administration.

One would expect Spalding to be an idealist, not only because he was well-schooled in Catholic theology, but also because he had done postgraduate study in Germany and was heavily influenced by German Idealism. But Spalding was a bridge-builder between the Catholic Church and the pragmatic American society of the turn of the century. He had a new-liberal socializing spirit and perhaps that is why he was so much admired by persons like Butler and Roosevelt.

It will be the aim of this paper to attempt to answer the title question through a brief exploration of Spalding's educational thought. This may best be done by triangulating it with the educational thought of William Torrey Harris, a contemporary representative of the idealistic tradition, and John Dewey, a contemporary representative of the pragmatic tradition. Spalding, Harris and Dewey were all interested in moral education and were all initially influenced by the German Idealists, especially Hegel. But while Harris remained a structural idealist all of his life, and Dewey soon became a democratic instrumentalist, it will appear that Spalding came to rest somewhere

between the two. He never forsook his strongly theological and aristocratic idealism, but he did combine it with an emphasis on the "progressive virtues" of self-activity, sociality, life, nature and progress which Dewey later espoused.¹

Definition of Education

Education was, in Spalding's opinion, the prism through which life could best be viewed. He told the International Congress of Arts and Sciences in St. Louis in 1904: "The history of the education of a people or an age is the history of its civilization, of its intellectual, moral, and religious life, its material progress being incidental and subordinate."² Spalding's educational philosophy was founded upon his belief in God. Like Harris, Spalding understood God to be the Prime Mover, the self-active force in the universe. This led him to the belief that man's end was to "make himself like God; in other words, that he may educate himself."³ Spalding took the gaining of the ability to educate oneself to be the meaning of the Gospel, saying: "You shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."⁴ Spalding's view of truth as related to God was all-inclusive, being integrated in both time and space. As he put it:

In the Universe there is nothing which exists separate and apart from other things. The satellites hold to the planets, the planets to the suns, the suns to one another, all in obedience to the same laws which bind the body to earth, and cause the water to flow and the vapor to rise. For the senses there is separateness, but for the mind there is union and unity. Communion is the law of souls as of bodies. Both are immersed in a boundless world, from which if they could be drawn forth they would cease to be. The principle of this infinite harmony is love, is God.⁵

This identification of God and love is important. Although Spalding was educated in the Neo-Scholastic tradition at the University of Louvain, he did not share the strong emphasis on truth and the intellect that is the heritage of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. Believing that "the Highest in the universe is a person, and the essential thing in personality is moral character,"⁶ he was more an heir of Plato, Augustine and Bonaventure. He thought love and will were more important than truth and intellect. He was, however, by no means anti-intellectual.

Spalding felt that God reveals Himself as⁷ beauty in art, as truth in science and as love in religion. He did not believe in "pie in the sky bye and bye," but held a view currently termed "realized eschatology," namely, that eternal life begins here and now. As Spalding put it: "God is even here, and even now we are immortal."⁸ Thus he held that only those people love God and their own souls "who strive in all earnestness to found on earth a heavenly kingdom wherein each one

shall have opportunity to work and to grow, wherein truth, justice, and love shall prevail."⁹

The one word that encapsulated Spalding's view of reality was "life." God possessed infinite life in Himself. When He created, it was a giving of life. Christ came to enlarge life, to exemplify what it meant when incarnated by God. In Spalding's words: "Life alone has absolute value: the rest, as religion, philosophy, art, science, wealth and position, have worth only in so far as they are related to life, proceed from it, express its meaning, and increase its power and beauty."¹⁰ The goal of life was (i.e.) "ceaseless growth toward God, - this is the ideal, this is the law of human life, proposed and sanctioned alike by Religion, Philosophy, and Poetry."¹¹ Thus it was that he saw that "the great purpose of education is to promote more conscious and more real union through communion of men with God, with one another, and with nature, which, could it be made perfect, would fill the world with the truth, goodness, and beauty that are the substance of ideals, and forever lure the noblest souls to heroic striving and enduring."¹² Spalding had a dynamic rather than static conception of education. He said: "Education is not a product: it is a process; and the universal failure of schools is attributable chiefly to the persuasion of teachers that their business is to turn out products, and not to start, stimulate, and direct processes of self-activity which shall continue as long as life."¹³

Spalding's phraseology sounds very much like Dewey's, who said: "Our net conclusion is that life is development, and that developing, growing, is life."¹⁴ Dewey defined education as "the enterprise of supplying the conditions which insure growth, or adequacy of life, irrespective of age."¹⁵ More technically, he described it as "that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience."¹⁶ The complementarity between Spalding and Dewey is not substantial, however. While Spalding saw life centered in an immanent God, Dewey was a pluralist.

Spalding was very probably acquainted with Dewey, but there is no record of any correspondence between them. Spalding perhaps had the Deweyan approach in mind when, in 1894, he described his frustration in dealing with the exponents of the New Philosophy:

I find in all the current theories of unbelief the assumption that all that can be known is relative, and that the highest conceivable philosophy is only phenomenology. With men who hold such opinions it is impossible to reason from fixed principles. The old methods fail to reach them. All the syllogisms that can be strung together can never compass a higher truth than that which is given in the original intuition, and if this does not attain to the reality underlying the phenomenon neither will our conclusions. The

assumption that knowledge is only the perception of relations makes all discussions as to what anything is in itself appear futile and childish. Hence the contempt of the modern schools for metaphysics and the scholastic methods. The great practical difficulty, as I take it, in successfully controverting the new theories lies in the fact that they represent modes of viewing things rather than states of mind. They are not held as conclusions from unanswerable arguments, but as a way of accounting for phenomena which is justified by the convergence of innumerable plausibilities toward a given line of thought. It is considered enough that they are in accord with the tendencies of the age, and in harmony with the great time-spirit, who, these philosophers teach, has usurped the throne of the Eternal and Omnipotent God.¹⁷

Harris' idea of education may be stated as follows: "More and more, society invents ways by which the individual can feel his own selfhood fully recognized in the requirements of social order. Education is the process of adoption of this social order in place of one's mere animal caprice. But it is the adoption of a consistent course of action instead of a self-contradictory one, and hence it is a renunciation of the freedom of the moment for the freedom that has the form of eternity."¹⁸ Spalding was quite in accord with Harris' idealism here, but he may have had trouble with this definition because of his strong respect for students' individuality and his refusal to view education as training for institutions. In 1894 he said: "There are many whose view of education is that it is a process of taming, like the domestication of animals. They strive to subdue the child and make him pliable to another's will; and when he has become thoroughly tame, they think he will be well educated. A tame horse, however, if we consider its own good, is inferior to one that is wild; and whoever or whatever is overcome and made subject is weakened and dispirited."¹⁹ Spalding may not have had Harris' view specifically in mind here, but Harris' own educational biographer admits that Harris' views did tend to support the position that Spalding was attacking.²⁰

Unlike Harris, Spalding simply could not agree that one of the basic aims of education was the formation of students for subservience to material institutions. Sadly musing on the ascendancy of utilitarian views, Spalding observed:

The aims and ends of practical education appeal to us with irresistible force; they have created our ideals. "We regard education," says Daniel Webster, "as a wise and liberal system of police, by which property and life and the peace of society are secured." Here is the paramount fact: both the school and the Church are, in our eyes,

chiefly a superior kind of police by which property and the peace of society are secured. The highest good, therefore, is property and the peace of society. They are ends, and whatever else is valuable is so but as a means to acquire and preserve property and the peace of society.

Now, property and the peace of society are desirable, indispensable even, and must be kept in view in every right system of education; but those alone who look above property and the peace of society, and strive in all earnestness to live in the infinite and permanent world of truth, beauty, and goodness, can hope to rise to the full height of a noble manhood.²¹

Spalding and Harris differed on a number of practical issues, most notably on the question of the denominational public school and the question of religion in the common schools. Nevertheless, they were friends. Harris once introduced Spalding for a lecture at a Catholic University as "the most beloved of American educational leaders."²²

The educational views of Spalding, Dewey and Harris were all closely tied to their philosophies of human nature. All three would probably have appreciated the anecdote about Zeno and Heraclitus: It seems that Zeno was talking one day with Heraclitus, who was maintaining that all things are constantly in a state of flux. "For instance," Heraclitus said, "I'm not really the same person I was a moment ago." At that point, Zeno punched him in the nose. "Why did you just punch me in the nose?" asked Heraclitus. "You?" replied Zeno, "why, I thought from what you just said that that was somebody else!" Spalding, Dewey, and Harris would all probably have laughed, but each for somewhat different reasons.

Relation of Intellect and Will

There is no question that Spalding was a dualist. In 1880 he wrote:

The optimistic view of progress, in our day, is based upon the supposed power of mental instruction to sustain morality, upon which the whole social order rests. But it is now abundantly evident to all who care to see that knowing and doing are not only distinct, but belong to different spheres of existence. The man who yields to lust, anger, drunkenness, knows full well that these passions are not only wrong, but hurtful to the bodily life even. This knowledge, however, does not influence his action. The heart is reached and character is created through the imagination rather than through the reason. The most carefully drawn deductions leave us cold and indifferent; but the voice of faith inspires the courage that makes martyrs and heroes. Knowledge

occupies the mind, it does not form it; whereas faith and love create character. Now, the whole tendency of our social life is to substitute knowledge for faith. Intellectual activity increases, but the unseen is put more and more out of mind.²³

Since Spalding thought of God as Love, he concluded that "We get nearer to the heart of being when we act rightly than when we speculate acutely."²⁴ He said that "We grow in likeness to what we love, not to what we know."²⁵ Thus, emotion rather than idea was the basis of morality for him. He thought that love was more important for life than knowledge, and that knowledge was the servant of love.²⁶ He said: "To become an ethical fact, to have moral worth, knowledge must pass into action. When scholars become doers the new order will begin. In the presence of whatever system of thought, ask yourself whether it can be made a rule of life; for life, and not speculation, is the test of truth."²⁷ This sounds like a conflation of Kant and Dewey. The categorical imperative is there, but so is something very close to organic reconstructionism.

Spalding's emphasis on the primacy of morality led him to have tepid faith in the outcomes of universal education and universal suffrage. He reasoned that "There is no necessary connection between popular education and civil liberty, as there is none between the enlightenment and the morality of a people."²⁸ He was not opposed to popular education or democratic institutions, but he was skeptical that they could effect the universal cures that many people expected from them.

Spalding extended his ideas on morality from the individual to the social scene. He believed that "the happiness of individuals and nations depends on moral more than on economic conditions."²⁹ Like Harris, Spalding believed that different peoples had different missions in the world. Along this line, Spalding stated: "I believe that he who will do the most to form the character of the Catholic youth of America, will also have done the most to mould the future of the American people."³⁰

Spalding sounded very Hegelian when he drifted into epistemology. "What we call matter," he said, "is known to us only when it has been sublimated in the soul's alembic, and so the visible universe is a symbol of the Infinite Spirit."³¹ Elsewhere he said: "Reality independent of mind is inconceivable."³² In these remarks, Spalding clearly places himself in the idealistic camp.

Although Spalding did not directly state a theory of human nature, it seems that he was influenced by the idealistic notion of the imperfection of matter, and perhaps by the Christian notion of Original Sin. "It is hard," said Spalding, "to love the multitude for what they are; the wise love in them the ideal of a higher life which they strive to realize here, believing and hoping that they thereby co-operate with the

Eternal for ends which are absolute."³³ Again, he said: "It may be well enough to exalt the people in meaningless praise; to declare their voice the voice of God, and their will the highest law; but in sober truth the people are ignorant, they are coarse, they are sensual - they are a motley crew."³⁴ It is not surprising, then, that although Spalding endorsed the motto that "truth is mighty and will prevail," he made an exception in its application to the moral order, believing that "prejudices, interests and passions hold such sway that it seems probable that the reign of error shall endure as long as the race of man."³⁵ Here Spalding is again closer to Harris than to Dewey.

Dewey believed that knowledge did not involve grasping antecedent reality or the contemplation of eternal essences. Rather, he believed that knowledge was doing. It was an organic, non-dualistic experience. He stood Plato on his head by saying that the ideal did not precede the actual; rather, the actual must precede the formation of the ideal. Spalding would not concur. Spalding followed Harris' emphasis on principles to inculcate ideals and the study of the classics to discover the manifestation of ideals in the past. For Spalding and Harris, ideals were prior to actuality, not vice versa.

Educational Psychology

Although Spalding was a faculty psychologist, he was not one in the narrow sense of just being concerned with drilling the faculties in order to develop them. He took a clear stand against anything that smacked of repression, saying on the subject:

Public opinion is a tyrant, who would make men cowards and hypocrites. That which dwarfs or darkens our being, though it should bring boundless wealth or endless fame, is simply evil. For what life-period do we educate? Childhood and youth are sacrificed to manhood, manhood to old age, which, for the few who reach it, is made miserable by this vicious philosophy. Strong, free, and joyous self-activity, during the whole course of life, can alone develop high, gracious and noble men and women. Whoever or whatever impedes thought and love is evil. When once we accept repression as a legitimate principle, there is no degradation to which we may not descend. Uniformity and equality are possible only when the play of man's nobler faculties is hindered. Why should we think it desirable to make all men alike, since God makes them unlike, and since the more truly they are alive, the greater their unlikeness becomes? Passion is the surging of life's current, and the effort to weaken or destroy it is an attempt on life. The wise educator seeks not to lessen passion, but to increase the intellectual and moral power by which it may be controlled.³⁶

Spalding thought that a complete theory of habituation would be the sum of practical wisdom and would be "a comprehensive system of pedagogics, and a safe guide for whoever occupies himself with education."³⁷ His feeling was, naturally enough, that habits were the result of repetition. He felt that this was true not only for bodily habits, but also for mental ones. As to how education was to deal with habits of the mind, Spalding said: "Its [the mind's] education is carried on by processes of repetition whereby its endowments, which themselves are outcomes of habits, are developed into habits of thinking, willing, and doing. Education, then, is the employment by man of Nature's methods for upbuilding and perfecting all that lives."³⁸ The aristocratic Spalding felt that "the multitude" were inferior because they were "habitually" lazy. As he put it, "The power to know and love pure truth and beauty is acquired, and it is necessarily lacking in the multitude who will not or cannot take the pains by which the faculty is produced."³⁹ For Spalding, education was more a training up than a drawing out.⁴⁰

Spalding, like Dewey, advocated learning by doing, but the following quotation shows that the underlying philosophy for this advocacy was far removed from Dewey's: "Learning about things is of small importance; while to learn to use the senses, and to turn the mind on things, is all-important. The young, to be deeply roused, require spiritual ideals; and they are fortunate when, in the light of these ideals, they are led to understand what is practical, that their enthusiasm for the good and the great may be sustained by delight in their work."⁴¹ The important thing for Spalding was how a pupil knew, not what he knew.⁴² He thought that "to know by heart is not to know at all" - an interesting comment, coming from the author of the Baltimore Catechism.⁴³ In summary, Spalding held a classical view of mental discipline.

The Nature-Nurture Question

Spalding never reached a consistent position on whether nature or nurture was more important in matters of education. When he stressed heredity, Spalding said that education simply unfolded the being that was received. Therefore, education "cannot make a poet of a mathematician, a great mind of a small one."⁴⁴ But Spalding felt that the aim of human life was not to become great, but rather to become genuine. He felt that education, aided by individual industry and good will, could accomplish this. When Spalding stressed the influence of environment, he said that nature gives little more than disposition and, "For the rest, what we become is the result of circumstances and the co-operation of the will, which is generally determined by environment and chance happenings."⁴⁵ When he seemed to try to decide which should receive the greater emphasis, heredity or environment, he said:

When we have said a thousand things in praise of education, we must, at last, come back to the fundamental fact that nearly everything depends on the kind of people of whom we are

descended, and on the kind of family in which our young years have passed. Nearly everything, but not everything; and it is this little which makes liberty possible, which inspires hope and courage, which, like the indefinable something that gives the work of genius its worth and stamp, makes us children of God and masters of ourselves.⁴⁶

But to Spalding the question was, at bottom, one of semantics. He said: "Whether education bestows power or merely gives freer and more varied action to endowments is a question of words. It brings into play faculties which without it do not exist or are in abeyance."⁴⁷ Actually, however, the distinction did make a difference, for, when Spalding leaned toward a hereditarian emphasis, a racist strain came to the surface. Here is an example: "In the tropics the race is and probably will always be indolent, ignorant, weak, and sensual. Heredity, too, plays a great part in the destiny of each one. We are in mind, as in body, largely what we have assimilated or what heredity - which is the outcome of endless assimilations - makes us. Those who are born with a taint in the blood, with perverted instincts and enfeebled wills, not only fall into vice more easily than others, but they are also more difficult to reclaim."⁴⁸

In sum, Spalding's notions on educational psychology are more in accord with the old psychology of Harris than the new psychology of Dewey.

Democratic Education

The question of education for democracy was a problematic one for Spalding. He felt that "The supreme problem for the individual, the family, the school, the State, and the Church, is how to harmonize liberty with order."⁴⁹ His basic principle for solving this problem was to maintain that a person's chief right is the right to grow and to bring oneself into harmony with all that is.⁵⁰ Like Dewey, Spalding had the subtle knack for emphasizing individual liberty while indirectly allowing for social control.

Spalding felt that a democratic form of government was ideally the best since, if the end of government was to promote the welfare of all, the giving of a "due degree of influence" to all was the surest way to promote the common welfare.⁵¹ "On the other hand," said Spalding, "there seems to be no doubt that the government of the best men is really the best government; and since this is so, then a democratic government, where the people are corrupt, is necessarily a bad government, because the vicious will not only not elect the best, who will not stoop to their level, but, by virtue of the law of affinity, will choose the baser sort of men."⁵²

When it came to the practical question of the effectiveness of a democratic form of government, Spalding's view of human nature took on a more pessimistic shading:

Liberty is obedience to law; and is it not absurd to assert that men are naturally obedient to law, when religion, education, civil authority, criminal codes, and other means have to be continually employed to enforce respect for authority? Do savages, barbarians, and children love the moral restraining without which it is not possible even to think of liberty? . . . Let us not imagine, then, that a free government such as ours rests upon the natural instincts of the human heart. We love the highest when we see it, but the low cannot see the highest, and only the best know the best. . . . Our great good fortune lies in our infinite wealth of opportunity.⁵³

Spalding's ideal aristocracy was an aristocracy of virtue. Spalding believed that "in a society like ours," the best, the "chosen ones," the models of life and the leaders of thought would be distinguished from "the crowd, not by accident or circumstance, but "by inner strength and beauty, finer knowledge, purer love and deeper faith in God."⁵⁴ He was quite sensitive to the excesses of the Gilded Age and in response to them sought "an aristocracy of culture, enlightened, reasonable, and benevolent, which shall help to counteract the baneful influence of an aristocracy founded merely upon wealth."⁵⁵

Spalding's pessimism about human nature became more pronounced when he faced radical questions of democracy. Using physical nature as a metaphor, he said: "Equality is a figment of theorists, inequality is nature's law."⁵⁶ His hereditary emphasis was quite apparent on the question of leadership in society. Spalding felt that "he who is born to lead finds followers, for nearly all men are born to follow."⁵⁷

Spalding was wary of the nineteenth century ebullient faith in popular education, which he interpreted as a faith that education could and should make all men equal. His own views about equality and education he stated quite clearly:

Men are not equal; and were they so, there would be no hope of better things. The multitude move, and have always moved, in a world of low thoughts and desires; and the few who, daring to be unlike the many, rise to higher modes of life, are the benefactors and civilizers by whom progress is made possible. The doctrine of equality is a prejudice of the weak and ignorant, whose conceit persuades them that none are strong and wise. The best are corrupted and disheartened by the crowd who have neither knowledge nor courage. Whatever the compound the chemical elements are the same; and among savages and barbarians the individual is but an atom, an undistinguished part of a homogeneous mass. Hence the measure of the

progress of the individual is the firmness and distinctness with which he stands for himself alone.

The only right opposition to inequality is universal opportunity for the best education. The fundamental law is the promotion of God-given endowments; and in a wisely ordered State there should be those whose office would require them to seek for the best talent, and to give it the best nurture, that no original power might be hindered from unfolding itself.⁵⁸

Believing that the noblest individuals and races were most susceptible to education, Spalding nevertheless felt that education would help accommodate all to their place in society, however lowly that might be:

It [the school] will not enable them to do what their endowments forbid, but it will make them more alive, more intelligent, less mechanical in their work. Whether they plough, or build, or sell goods, or run machines, or practice law or medicine, the fact that they have been to school will add to their efficiency because they will bring the mind to bear on what they do, will be less dwarfed and crippled by their tasks, and will therefore labor with more heart and joy. The more men are educated, the less will they become drudges, the less will they be in love with the strenuous life.⁵⁹

This is a view very close to Dewey's. Dewey told the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress in 1917 that, "To counteract the soulless monotony of machine industry, a premium must be put upon initiative, intellectual independence and inventiveness. Hence, schooling must not model itself upon the automatic repetitiousness of machines, whether in the name of the false gods of practical skill or of discipline. . . . The imagination must be so stored that in the inevitable monotonous stretches of work, it may have worthy material of art and literature and science upon which to feed, instead of being frittered away upon undisciplined dreamings and sensual fancies."⁶⁰

Spalding dealt with the ancient problem of the One and the Many in these words: "The race exists for the individual: the individual for the race only insofar as it is the indispensable means of producing personalities - the final end of the universe which is the work of a supreme person."⁶¹ Feeling that progress was shaped by personal effort rather than by impersonal force, Spalding predicted on a couple of occasions that if the top one hundred minds in all spheres of human activity were removed from society, the national life would be lowered.⁶²

Spalding realized that society was a necessity for the development of individuals, but he was wary of immersion in society. Following the lead of one of his favorite authors, Thomas à Kempis, Spalding stated that "one cannot become a man in the true sense, if he live much in the company of his fellows."⁶³ In words that have a somewhat mixed heritage, Spalding did, however, speak of the need for sociality in education: "We can educate for a larger environment only by teaching the young to adapt themselves to one which is smaller. The home should educate for the school, the school for the church and the State, the church and the State for the human race and God."⁶⁴ The first part of the passage sounds like Dewey, but the last part sounds like Harris.

Harris is characterized as a structural idealist because of the importance he placed on institutions in relationship to ideals and their realization. While Spalding realized the importance of institutions, and was equally as defensive of the maintenance of the status quo as was Harris, his strong aristocratic individualism prevented him from explicitly allowing that the individual, or education, should be in the service of institutions.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, Spalding recognized the importance of inculcating children with the habits of obedience, attention, respect, politeness, order, punctuality, and industry.⁶⁶

In summary, Spalding shared similarities with both Harris and Dewey in their thinking about education for democracy. He recommended the same kind of orderly habits that Harris was noted for promoting.⁶⁷ He did stress the importance of institutions, but for individualistic purposes. For the same reason, he favored sociality in education. While Dewey advocated an economic democracy which entailed a fluid meritocratic system,⁶⁸ Spalding hoped for a moral democracy led by the best and the brightest.⁶⁹

Educational Methodology

In the area of educational methodology, Spalding was ready to admit, with Dewey, that observation was a better teaching technique than lecture.⁷⁰ But a good teacher was important here. Under the guidance of a good teacher, Spalding felt, the pupil feels not so much that he receives as that he discovers.⁷¹ Spalding also counselled, in good Deweyan fashion, that students should have sympathy with all creation - with dogs, chairs, atoms and a host of other things. Everything, in fact, that "may help to bind the universe about the feet of God and around the heart of man."⁷² The Deweyan organic view is here; however it is, at base, dualistic.

Like Dewey, Spalding gave a large place to experience, saying: "One's own experience is the sole means whereby he can determine for himself whether a thing be true or useful or delectable or beautiful."⁷³ Following up on this point, he emphasized the experiential value of suffering, claiming that "those who have not suffered are ignorant."⁷⁴ Coming close to Dewey's stress on teaching through occupations, Spalding

stated: "We are in the best school when we have learned to convert the daily happenings and work into means of education."⁷⁵ Unlike Dewey, Spalding probably did not mean "school" here literally.

Despite Spalding's progressive rhetoric, he was not in accord with the unidealistic instrumentalism of Dewey. The kernel of his objection can be found in these words:

The highest wisdom is that which teaches us how to strengthen the will and to turn it resolutely to the love and practice of virtue, without which life is worthless. Hence it is unwise, not to say immoral, to commend virtue on the ground of policy; for virtue may not be policy, and to love it for anything else than its own rightness is to sin against its very idea; and so, if we would seek truth profitably we must learn to feel that it alone can rightly nourish our intellectual and moral life.⁷⁶

The essence of instrumentalism, for Spalding, was an erroneous severing of means from ends. He once criticized the Socratic belief that knowledge is virtue as having much the same fault. The analysis, in abbreviated form, runs as follows: "He who does evil does it from a mistake of judgment. Sin is error. . . . But Socrates moved in a circle from which there is no escape. To know the useful is virtue. But what is useful? That which makes for virtue."⁷⁷ The Socratic dilemma is essentially the one in which Dewey was locked. Even if Dewey objected that an action is simply an ongoing step in a series of steps, he would still not be saved from the logical difficulty of attempting to measure an action with the action itself, and its place in the series, being used for the standard of measure. Dewey once remarked in regard to this difficulty that we do not solve problems of this kind, rather, we "get over them."⁷⁸ Spalding, however, never got over them.

Conclusion

Merle Curti, in his still popular The Social Ideas of American Educators, devoted a full chapter to Spalding's thought and work. Although he provided a comprehensive summary of Spalding, he oversimplified his conclusion by claiming that Spalding appealed to "authority, the past, and the supernatural" to cure America's ills.⁷⁹ In his basic philosophy Spalding did share the conservative idealism of Harris, his thinking did have religious roots, and he was indeed an intellectual aristocrat; but his utterances resonated with the strategic view of Dewey, and his educational theory was open enough in the direction of progressive thinking to allow him to act as an accommodator between German idealism and American pragmatism. But was he an idealist or was he a pragmatist? In a sense he was both. For lack of a better label he might be termed a pragmatic idealist.

FOOTNOTES

1. A traditional Catholic educator has claimed that Spalding "anticipated John Dewey on every worthwhile, so-called strong point of progressive education by a dozen years." Edward J. Power, "Progressive Education and Bishop Spalding," Catholic Educational Review 51 (December 1953): 673.
2. John L. Spalding, Religion and Art and Other Essays (Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1905), p. 68. Hereafter abbreviated as RAO.
3. John L. Spalding, Means and Ends of Education (Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1895), p. 152. Hereafter abbreviated as ME.
4. John L. Spalding, Things of the Mind (Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1894), p. 88. Hereafter abbreviated as TM.
5. ME, p. 18.
6. John L. Spalding, Glimpses of Truth (Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1903), p. 81. Hereafter abbreviated as GT.
7. John L. Spalding, Thoughts and Theories of Life and Education (Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1897), p. 125. Hereafter abbreviated as TT. Spalding once wrote that "all truth is orthodox." Cf. John L. Spalding, Religion, Agnosticism and Education (Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1902), p. 167. Hereafter abbreviated as RAE.
8. RAE, pp. 156-157.
9. RAO, p. 170.
10. John L. Spalding, Aphorisms and Reflections (Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1901), p. 284. Hereafter abbreviated as AR.
11. John L. Spalding, Education and the Higher Life (Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1890), p. 138. Hereafter abbreviated as EH.
12. RAO, pp. 112-113.
13. GT, p. 56.
14. John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1916), p. 59.
15. Ibid., p. 61.
16. Ibid., pp. 89-90.
17. TM, pp. 214-215.

18. William Torrey Harris, Psychologic Foundations of Education (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1898), p. 282.
19. TM, p. 87.
20. John S. Roberts, William T. Harris (Washington: National Education Association, 1924), pp. 55-56.
21. RAE, p. 221.
22. William T. Harris, "Remarks Introducing Bishop Spalding for Address on Higher Education of Women, at Catholic University, Washington, 1899," Harris Papers, No. 620, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
23. John L. Spalding, The Religious Mission of the Irish People (New York: The Catholic Publication Society Co., 1880), p. 125. Hereafter abbreviated as RM.
24. AR, p. 65.
25. John L. Spalding, Essays and Reviews (New York: The Catholic Publication Society, 1877), p. 125. Hereafter abbreviated as ER.
26. John L. Spalding, Lectures and Discourses (New York: The Catholic Publication Society Co., 1890), pp. 149-150. Hereafter abbreviated as LD. Cf. also TT, pp. 76-77.
27. TM, p. 68.
28. ER, p. 133. Cf. also John L. Spalding, Socialism and Labor and Other Arguments (Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1902), p. 53. Hereafter abbreviated as SL. Cf. also John L. Spalding, The Life of the Most Rev. M. J. Spalding, D.D., (New York: The Catholic Publication Society, 1873), pp. 364-366. Hereafter abbreviated as LMS. Cf. also ER, pp. 118 & 269.
29. AR, p. 29.
30. John R. Hassard, A History of the United States of America for the Use of Schools (With an Introduction by Bishop J. L. Spalding), (New York: The Catholic Publication Society Co., 1878), p. vii.
31. RAE, p. 7.
32. AR, p. 290.
33. John L. Spalding, Opportunity and Other Essays and Addresses (Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1900), p. 126. Hereafter abbreviated as OO.

34. LD, pp. 254-255.
35. AR, p. 127.
36. TM, pp. 69-70.
37. GT, p. 38.
38. GT, pp. 166-167.
39. GT, pp. 181-182. Cf. also GT, pp. 172-173; EH, p. 162; OO, p. 128.
40. ME, p. 131.
41. TT, pp. 48-49.
42. AR, p. 22.
43. John L. Spalding, "Normal Schools for Catholics," The Catholic World 51 (April, 1890): 91.
44. RAE, p. 280.
45. GT, p. 71. Cf. also RAO, p. 178; AR, p. 12
46. ME, pp. 47-48. Cf. also TM, p. 84; ME pp. 113 & 188; AR, p. 90; OO, p. 179.
47. TM, p. 62.
48. SL, p. 83. Cf. also AR, pp. 243-244; RAE, pp. 198-199; TT, p. 112; AR, pp. 117 & 154; India and China cited as "unintelligent, unprogressive, and uninteresting." TT, p. 209; References to superiority of the Aryan race: EH, p. 139 & ME, pp. 96-97.
49. TM, p. 17.
50. TM, p. 16.
51. SL, p. 41.
52. SL, pp. 41-42.
53. Ibid.
54. EH, pp. 60-61.
55. RAE, p. 218. Cf. also EH, p. 155.
56. TM, pp. 125-126; Emphasis added. Cf. also AR, pp. 253-254.

57. TM, p. 35; Emphasis added. Cf. also AR, p. 68; EH, pp. 208-209; AR, p. 30; TM, pp. 121-122; TM, p. 117; AR, p. 130; Spalding's theology was conditioned by his aristocratic ideas, as may be seen in his link of the Gospel saying that the heavenly kingdom is open to all, but only the few enter, with his advocacy of earthly aristocracy. GT, pp. 163-164. However, it was not aristocratism, but liberalism, which involved Spalding in the Americanist heresy. Cf. Robert Newton Barger, John Lancaster Spalding: Catholic Educator and Social Emissary (Ann Arbor: Xerox University Microfilms, 1977), chapter 4.
58. TM, pp. 72-73.
59. RAO, p. 134. Cf. also RAO, p. 129; ME, pp. 78-79.
60. John Dewey, "The Need of an Industrial Education in an Industrial Democracy," Proceedings of the Second Pan American Scientific Congress (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917), section IV, part I, p. 224.
61. GT, p. 62.
62. OO, pp. 61 & 125.
63. GT, p. 120.
64. TT, pp. 65-66.
65. TT, p. 47. Cf. also TM, p. 68; AR, p. 221; RAE, p. 57.
66. TT, pp. 65 & 69.
67. Cf. A Statement of the Theory of Education in the United States of America (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1874). Harris was both a co-author and a signer of this industrially oriented document. Cf. also Merle Curti, The Social Ideas of American Educators (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1971 [originally published in 1935]), pp. 334-335.
68. Cf. Clarence J. Karier, Paul C. Violas, and Joel Spring, Roots of Crisis (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Co., 1973), pp. 95-104.
69. EH, pp. 28-29.
70. OO, pp. 113-114.
71. AR, p. 152.
72. TT, pp. 126-127.
73. GT, p. 43.

- 74. GT, p. 44.
- 75. AR, p. 151.
- 76. OO, p. 129.
- 77. GT, p. 203.
- 78. Quoted in Perry Miller, American Thought, Civil War to World War I (Cloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1954), p. 224.
- 79. Curti, op. cit., p. 373.

ABSTRACTIONS IN PROGRESSIVE THOUGHT

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Despite the many achievements of twentieth century philosophy, rationalism and empiricism remain the heart of our philosophical heritage. At bottom they represent opposing conceptions of the origin and nature of what might be called "abstract facts." Rationalism looks at the structure or organization of things as an objective self-sustaining reality, a reality that is in no way contingent on experience. Progressive thought of this and the last century, and in particular pragmatism, arose as an attempt to provide an alternative to these extremes. It rejects rationalism for its commitment to formalism and repudiates empiricism because it makes nominalism unavoidable.

This is most evident, perhaps, in the progressive's conception of education. The idea of progressive education was the result of an attempt to mediate the extremes of formalism and nominalism in their educational manifestations. Progressives believed that it defined a synthesis position that was a more reliable guide to educational practice, as well as a more defensible conception of the educational enterprise. Before we can say exactly what this idea was, however, we need to know more about the educational viewpoints of formalism and nominalism, the two alternatives the progressive synthesis was designed to supersede.

Educational formalists, or "traditionalists" as they were sometimes called, began by making two assumptions: first, as a factual claim, that human beings are unique because of their mental potential; and, second, as a normative claim, that this potential is a source of intrinsic value. Together these assumptions delineate the perspective of humanism. Formalists accepted the humanist's aim as the aim of all education. Briefly put, it states that education is to develop the unique mental potential of every human being. It is not enough that they should learn, they must also develop their minds; or, to express the same point in more modern language, they must also learn how to learn.

As a means for attaining this goal formalists suggested a variety of a priori processes. Pure reason, or deductive thinking, was usually put forward as the best method for developing mental faculties. But alternatives like meditation and contemplation were also sometimes employed. We might note, too, that tradition and authority were frequently thought to be essential for learning to occur. This was not because they were ever equated with a priori processes, however, either in whole or in part. Rather, it was because

they were widely assumed to be necessary for the discipline that a priori processes need to sustain themselves.

Nominalists were quick to disagree, arguing that formalists totally misconceived both the aim and the means of education. As an abstraction the formalists' aim was said to be reducible to the acquisition of knowledge (through transmission, discovery or creation), or else to be altogether meaningless. The reason for this should be obvious. Mental faculties, or capacities, are forms of experience; they structure experience and, from the perspective of nominalism, must be conceived in terms of concrete, particular things, or else declared objectively unintelligible. Where the formalists' aim was reducible to the acquisition of knowledge, nominalists believed it could be expressed in one or more of three distinct modes: (1) knowledge of facts that provide a cognitive grasp or conceptual understanding (propositional knowledge); (2) knowledge of skills that define behavioral competencies (performative knowledge); and/or (3) knowledge of habits or attitudes that constitute tendencies, propensities or proclivities (dispositional knowledge).

Not only did nominalists speak of knowledge in a variety of modes, they also differed as to the ontological status of knowledge according to whether they were positivists or phenomenologists. Where they were positivists they were inclined to emphasize the importance of acquiring knowledge of the world. Knowledge was assumed to be an objective representation of an independently existing reality. Where they were phenomenologists they were inclined to emphasize the importance of acquiring knowledge of the self. Reality was assumed to be subjective; thus, all knowledge, albeit unavoidably subjective too, was held to be implicitly self-knowledge. These differences are extremely important as they bear on most theoretical questions. However, where the issue concerns education's ultimate aim, they matter hardly at all. Nominalists believed that the goal of education was to acquire knowledge, whatever its mode of expression or ontological status, and not to develop the mind as conceived along formalist lines.

Nominalists rejected the formalists' conception of means with the same degree of decisiveness. They believed it impossible to acquire substantive knowledge solely, if at all, through a priori processes. Nominalists were committed to philosophical empiricism, or the view that all substantive knowledge is founded on experience. By "experience" was meant "sense perception." Thus, a priori processes were ruled out from the start, since they transcend sense perception by their very definition.

On the standards of empiricism, talk of experience in fields of a priori study, like logic and mathematics, for instance, is inevitably metaphorical. Such inquiry is assumed to be purely conceptual, making resultant knowledge completely independent of sense perception and, therefore, not literally founded on experience. From the perspective provided by

philosophical empiricism, nominalists concluded that the only way to gain substantive knowledge was through experience and practical action. When translated into educational terms this meant that human beings could not learn about the world, or even themselves, without first working to solve practical problems and reflecting on consequential experiences.

Progressive philosophers of education, best exemplified by John Dewey, took something and rejected something from both formalists and nominalists. They shared the formalists' commitment to humanism and looked upon the evolution of human mental potential, or mental development, as education's highest objective. Thus they agreed with the formalists' conception of the aim of all education.

We need to recognize, however, that progressive philosophers repudiated the formalists' contention that humanism could be founded on classical metaphysics and theology. Theirs was a naturalistic humanism, grounded in the findings of science. As a consequence they were led to disagree with formalists on the question of educational means. Progressive philosophers were strongly opposed to the use of a priori methods. They believed that the ultimate aim of education was contingent upon experience, at least experience of a certain sort, and upon practical action, at least practical action of a certain kind. Although progressive philosophers did not always agree on exactly what experience and practical action were best suited for particular educational tasks, they were invariably of one mind in arguing that mental development could not take place in a vacuum, as formalists seemed to suggest.

Although progressive philosophers were in accord with nominalists as to the educational significance of experience and practical action, they rejected the nominalists' conception of education's ultimate aim,¹ first, because they did not see mental development as reducible to concrete particular things (the acquisition of knowledge of the world, in the view of positivism), or as representing subjective creations of the mind (the acquisition of knowledge of the self, from the perspective of phenomenism); and second, because they did not see the idea of mental development as utterly meaningless. At least for the fundamental purpose of education, they considered knowledge to have instrumental rather than intrinsic value. They saw it as necessary all right, and most assuredly they did not believe it to be subjective. But they defended its acquisition mainly for the role it played in evolving the capacities to think and to experience human emotions.

Abstract Facts and the Progressive Synthesis

In accepting the educational aim of the formalists while at the same time insisting on the means proposed by the nominalists, progressive philosophers were faced with two very difficult questions: (1) If mental capacities are not determined outside of nature, as formalists say they are, but are

not reducible and/or subjective categories, as nominalists maintain, how can they be rightly conceived, especially for purposes of education? (2) If subject-matter does not have an independent, inherent structure, as formalists say it does, but is not ordered solely by perception, as nominalists claim, how can it best be thought of, particularly in educational situations?

These questions are important for precisely the same reason that they are difficult to answer. They represent exactly the central issue between formalism and nominalism. Unless progressive philosophers were able to answer them satisfactorily, they could not have attained their desired synthesis, not only for education, but in general, since, as Dewey pointed out in Democracy and Education, education is the laboratory for testing philosophical ideas.² One might readily conclude that the synthesis pursued by these thinkers was actually a myth and that formalism and nominalism remain the only intelligible options.

In the opinion of most knowledgeable observers, progressive philosophers met with considerable success in their efforts to establish a defensible third alternative. However, problems continue to persist. While their criticisms of formalism were devastating to the point where today few would argue that formalism has much life, their criticisms of nominalism leave much to be desired. The reason is that the conceptual system of progressive thought is hard to distinguish from the conceptual system of nominalism. Progressive philosophers were effective in criticizing formalism because their intellectual orientation, with its emphasis on naturalism and empiricism, was so radically different from the orientation of formalism. And, as a rule, the more two conceptual systems differ, the more one can be used to criticize the other. But correspondingly, the more they are alike, the less they can serve to undercut one another. Progressive thought appears in many ways to be an ally of nominalism and to this extent seems impotent when used to oppose the orientation that nominalism assumes.

Strangely enough, the crucial point at which progressive thought appears to maintain a nominalistic stance is where it purportedly rejects the priority of consciousness in the knowledge process, the cornerstone of nominalism, and argues in favor of what is believed to be a superior conception of experience. This position is absolutely central to progressive thinking and can be traced back through Dewey and George H. Mead to Charles S. Peirce's 1868 papers opposing the idea of intuition as a form of perception.³ If only for this reason, it is extremely unfortunate that this position appears to be something of a soft-spot in the progressives' armor. When it is not seen as altogether unintelligible, it is usually seen as a support for nominalism. Obviously, it was not so intended.

Nominalists, it will be recalled, said that abstractions could be reduced to physical terms, or else were sub-

jective. Consciousness was held to be such an abstraction.⁴ Were anyone to insist on calling it a fact in itself, nominalists would say that it was a subjective fact, or a fact in some metaphorical sense, since actually it was an imaginary creation. Nominalists utilized consciousness as their starting point. Then they asked if there was anything that was not subjective, that is, if there was anything that was outside consciousness. Phenomenalists, or subjective idealists, decided in the negative, saying that everything was subjective and that, therefore, reality could not transcend experience. Moreover, they said, were things ever to become objective and exist outside our phenomenal field, these things could never be known, for we are all prisoners of our subjective perceptions. Positivists maintained a stance that was somewhat different, declaring that concrete particular things were objective facts residing outside consciousness; and, furthermore, that these facts could be known through our senses, that is, through experience.

Progressive philosophers agreed with positivists that concrete particular things were objective facts that could be known through experience. They agreed, too, that consciousness was an abstract fact. But they disagreed as to the ontological status of this fact, and as to the ontological status of abstractions generally. They insisted that abstractions could sometimes be objective and, thus, represent objective facts. On this point progressive philosophers were in agreement with formalists. They insisted on one crucial difference, however. Formalists regarded abstractions as extra-natural facts, whereas progressive philosophers saw them as consequences of interacting natural events and, therefore, as part of nature.

While this difference between progressive philosophers and formalists has always been more or less understood, the difference between progressive philosophers and positivists has rarely been fully appreciated. Usually the two are assumed to represent the same position against formalism. Both are interpreted as saying that abstractions are subjective, except where they can be operationally defined. As a result, criticisms of formalism advanced by progressive philosophers are seen to have considerable force; but their criticisms of positivism, and nominalism generally, are viewed as strange aberrations, or else ignored altogether. For if progressive thought were merely a version of nominalism, then its conceptual orientation would not permit such criticism. Surely, from what we have seen so far, progressive thought is more than a version of nominalism. Yet, one must admit that progressive philosophers were not always clear in their analysis of abstract terms. The problem is all too familiar. In arguing against formalism on this score, they frequently appear to have committed themselves to nominalism and, in particular, to positivism.

Their equivocal posture is, perhaps, most evident in the area of psychology. At times they seem to have sympathized

with positivists who wanted to reduce mental life to its physical manifestations. They seem to have shared the belief of radical behaviorists, in particular, who wanted to define mentalistic conceptions solely in terms of behavior, and who, thereby, ended up with purely behavioral descriptions of mental life. But when confronted with this charge, progressive philosophers vehemently denied it. They acknowledged their commitment to behavioral explanations of mental phenomena; yet they stated emphatically that theirs was a position designed to reject behavioral conceptions of mind, and behavioral descriptions of mental life, in general. They wanted to say that behavioral conceptions could be used to explain consciousness, for example, but could not be used to define consciousness as a fact. The reason for this is that behavioral conceptions represent concrete particular things, while mentalistic conceptions represent abstractions. And abstractions can never be reduced in meaning to concrete particular things.

This distinction between natural facts that are abstract and those that are concrete and particular provides the basis for distinguishing progressive thought from nominalism. If they can be understood and defended, then criticism of nominalism made by progressive philosophers will be powerful, indeed. But if they cannot, then surely these criticisms will be flawed. On the one hand, progressive thought must justify a conception of abstract natural facts that is logically distinct from the conception of concrete, particular things. On the other hand, this conception must differ from the conception of non-natural abstractions offered by formalism. Are there irreducible abstract qualities of nature that are not creations of the mind, or mere figments of the imagination, but instead represent objective realities?

Progressive philosophers based their affirmative answer to this question on the following rationale: Abstract facts are relational facts. More specifically, they exist as natural process of transaction between physical things in nature and, thus, are themselves facts of nature. So much for formalism; but what about nominalism?

Insofar as abstract facts do not represent relations that transcend nature, must we not acknowledge their fundamental subjectivity? Surely, not according to progressive philosophers. Abstract facts are subjective only where relations are subjective. Where relations are not subjective, neither are abstract facts. Or, put more precisely, where relations are objective, abstract facts are also objective. That things can be so related is, of course, obvious. Connections are often independent of anyone's or any group's volition. The sun is related objectively to the planets, for example; and in the same manner a person may be related objectively to society, to other individuals, or even to himself. This is not to say that it is impossible, in principle, for a person to control or influence these relations, but rather that, as relations, they exist as objective realities. So

long as relations are more than mental constructions, so long as they exist "in fact," or "in nature," and not just "in the mind," they are objective, not subjective. They represent abstractions all right, but they are real independently of their recognition or perception.

On further analysis, progressive philosophers represent abstract natural facts as incorporating relations of two types: first, relations that are free of human affects, i.e., relations such as those constituting "the laws of nature," or the laws that govern the physical world;⁵ second, relations created, or at least influenced, by human beings, i.e., relations we might call "the laws of man," or laws that govern social life, laws more commonly known as "rules" or "norms."⁶ Progressive philosophers maintained that relations of both types could exist as objective natural abstractions.⁷ Nominalists were quick to challenge this position, especially as it applies to relations of the second type. How can relations be objective when created or influenced by human volition? Progressive philosophers responded by pointing out that to create or influence a fact is not necessarily to deny it independent ontological status. Once created or influenced, relations can well have a life of their own.⁸

Abstract facts constitute the structure of the world, or, alternatively, the structure of our experience. While there is no reason to think of these facts as extra-natural qualities, neither is there justification for believing they are subjective or reducible to concrete particular things, or so progressive philosophers would say. Assuming a distinction between appearance and reality and, furthermore, acknowledging the possibility of error in our perception of abstract facts, they concluded that structure was a non-reducible objective reality that resulted from a natural process of transaction between human organisms and their biosocial environments. Prior to this transactional process neither human organisms nor their biosocial environments can be said to be extensively defined, even in potential. Both acquire character in a context of action where, in the name of practicality, each acts and is acted upon by the other. Through mutual influence they accrue a definite nature. Human organisms take on recognizable personalities, evolving simultaneously identities and the capacities of mind. Their biosocial environments take on a distinct organization. Facts become more precise and, in the process, easier to perceive.

Laws are, perhaps the most important example of environmental facts that would be considered objective natural⁹ abstractions on this analysis of progressive philosophers. But in the human sphere the most important example is undoubtedly that of values. For values not only structure our experience, but they also provide a framework for its evaluation. By assuming an orientation that incorporates values we can appraise, as well as describe, what we see. While denying that values were non-natural qualities, progressive philosophers refused to admit that they were no more than subjective

preferences. As objective natural abstractions, values were analyzed as relations that could be demonstrated empirically to advance human welfare, an idea that was itself conceived as an objective natural abstraction.

Other examples of objective natural abstractions could be easily multiplied. In the human sphere they were limited only by relations created or influenced by human volition and subsequently objectified. Of special importance to progressive educational thought were feelings, desires, interests, and needs. Of equal or greater significance were mental capacities, human purposes, intelligence and thinking itself. All these phenomena were regarded as empirical and, therefore, as objective realities. Nevertheless, they were assumed to be abstractions impossible to reduce to concrete, particular things.

The New Alliance

When progressive education was officially initiated in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the primary concern among educators centered around the means that were best for education to employ. On this matter progressives joined forces with nominalists to oppose vigorously formalists who relied on a priori processes. For a priori processes they substituted experience and practical action. This alliance lasted well into the twentieth century and, by and large, had positive effects. Today nearly everyone would agree that progressivists and nominalists were right.

But now that the original concern has waned, a new problem has emerged. Have educators lost sight of their ultimate objective? In response to this question progressives have formed a new alliance with formalists. Both want to criticize nominalists, who contend that education's fundamental aim is to transmit knowledge, or promote learning. Progressivists remain true to their naturalism, and formalists retain their belief in non-natural qualities. But rather than emphasize their differences, they stress their mutual commitment to humanism and their belief that this commitment is founded on non-reducible, objective facts.

Their opposition to nominalism stems from the latter's denial of a meaningful distinction between the capacities to think and experience human emotions (or the process of acquiring these capacities, a process we have referred to as "learning how to learn") and actual knowledge of some sort (or the process of acquiring this knowledge, a process we have called "learning"). Of the many objections voiced against nominalism, two stand out as most important: first, that it destroys the objectivity of values (since values are, in Peirce's terms, "generals" and generals are, for the nominalist, subjective); second, that it makes it impossible to develop a critical perspective on the issues of contemporary life, issues, for instance, that are political, social and philosophical (since a critical perspective assumes that mental capacities, or the capacities to learn, are, in some

significant sense, separate from and, thus, capable of transcending actual knowledge that has been acquired, or learning that has been achieved).

Progressivists have a problem here. They know that their opposition to nominalism rests on their conception of abstract natural facts. Still, at times they seem to give abstract conceptions positivistic definitions. And their theory of meaning is easily construed as limiting cognitive significance exactly in this way. Furthermore, even if their theory is interpreted more sympathetically so as to include non-reducible abstractions as meaningful facts, their conception of these facts is not easy to understand. How can natural qualities be empirically verified if, as a matter of principle, they are beyond immediate sense perception? Progressivists offer an answer of sorts to this question, but they are not always clear or consistent in what they say.

Progressive educational thought assumes that this conception of abstract natural facts is a sound philosophical doctrine. If it is not without its shortcomings, it is because the parent scheme from which it is derived also has its problems. Undoubtedly, most progressive philosophers in education were aware of these difficulties, even if only superficially. The story is told of one prominent figure who used the name of a positivist colleague as a curse word. The incident was not without reason. Progressive philosophers would often exude confidence, and even display a certain swagger, when in the professional company of formalists. But when nominalists were around they would usually appear much less pretentious. They seemed to know that, for whatever reason, it would be harder to make their arguments stick.

How can this behavior be explained? One possibility is that the conceptual system of progressive philosophy is weak at its heart, or else is tantamount to nominalism. In either case the apparent failure to undermine nominalism would be real. Another possibility is that all too frequently progressive thinkers, or supporters of progressive thought, have had no more than a superficial understanding of their avowed position. Still a third possibility is that progressive philosophers have realized their desired synthesis, at least in outline, but for some reason have not been clear or consistent in communicating their ideas to others.

There is probably something to say for each of these explanations. But the last is probably closest to the truth. The original group of progressive philosophers, three of whom we have briefly mentioned, did not present a finished or polished point of view. They relied on too many illustrations and employed too few actual arguments. They did more than enough, however, to reveal the outlines of their desired synthesis. Those who see themselves in the progressive tradition have much to do in the way of working out progressive ideas. But, most assuredly, they are not limited, as some would have us believe, to proselytizing an old and tired doctrine.

FOOTNOTES

1. We must add an important qualification here. Unlike nominalists, or at least positivists, progressive philosophers did not make a hard and fast distinction between substantive and conceptual inquiry. They regarded the separation of a priori and a posteriori knowledge as contextual. Thus, experience enters into conceptual investigations; and empirical studies, which give rise to experience, include reflection that is primarily conceptual.
2. John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 329. l.c. (Originally published by the Macmillan Co., 1916). The remark referred to appears amid a general discussion of the relation of education to philosophy. Dewey writes that "Education is the laboratory in which philosophic distinctions become concrete and are tested."
3. The papers include (1) "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man," (2) "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities," and (3) "Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic: Further Consequences of Four Incapacities." Each is reprinted in the Collected Works of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 135-222.
4. We are not talking here merely of our "idea" (or alternatively, our "conception") of consciousness. While nominalists admitted that ideas (or conceptions) could be abstract, they believed the issue was concerned basically with the referents of ideas (or conceptions). Ultimately, nominalists were concerned with ontological questions and not merely with questions of logic or language. Of course, phenomenologists maintained that these questions cannot be distinguished, and positivists sometimes seemed to say the same. Nevertheless, to be a nominalist was to be concerned ultimately with ontology.
5. Physical relations are generally of this type. In the physical sciences they are often depicted by theoretical terms. Terms such as "equilibrium" and "election" are designed to describe objective natural abstractions that cannot be operationally defined. Sigmund Freud intended his concepts of "id," "ego," and "super ego" to be relations of this sort.
6. The difference between physical and social relations ("laws of nature" and "laws of man") can, perhaps, be illustrated by the now common philosophical distinctions between "brute facts" and "institutional facts." (See G. E. M. Anscombe, "On Brute Facts," Analysis 18 (1958), and John R. Searle, "Deriving 'Ought' from 'Is'", in Speech Acts (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 175-198. Brute facts are sheer movements or bare ontological states that possess a minimum degree of psychological and social

significance (e.g., "The car went eighty miles an hour."). Institutional facts are brute facts that possess psychological and social prominence (e.g., "George is married.").

7. Admittedly, progressive philosophers were not always careful in making this distinction. Peirce was the most careful by far. But even he spoke of "laws" when he meant to speak of rules or norms. Terminological problems aside, it is clear that progressive philosophers, especially Peirce, wanted to recognize this distinction. In this regard they have much in common with Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud. Marx and Freud also relied on this distinction although, like progressive philosophers, not always clearly. They may be seen as striving to develop their own synthesis position; that is, as wanting to show that formalism and nominalism were not the only orientations one could take regarding questions that interested them. They shared the conviction of progressive philosophers that reality contains objective natural abstractions. This is not to deny, however, that there were important differences between the progressivists, Marx, and Freud.
8. An analogy might be helpful here. Even though Frankenstein created his monster, the monster was nonetheless an objective reality. It is as foolish for nominalists to say that relations are subjective when created or influenced by human beings, as for someone to say that the monster was a figment of Frankenstein's imagination because he, Frankenstein, brought the monster into being. Once the monster was created (as a product), it existed as an independent fact. It is worth noting that the process of creating the monster was also objective.
9. The work of Peirce stands out as the best illustration of this point.

BUSINESS MEETING MINUTES

Midwest Philosophy of Education Society
Annual Conference, Chicago, Illinois
November 11-12, 1977

Old Business

1. The meeting was called to order by President Arthur Brown. Treasurer's report* and minutes of the previous meeting in Milwaukee, Wisconsin were read by Secretary-Treasurer George Kizer. Both were approved by the membership in attendance.
2. The secretary was instructed to send letters of appreciation to institution officials at the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle Campus, in behalf of the Arrangements Chairman, Charles Tesconi. Similar letters were to be sent in behalf of the Program Committee consisting of Walter Krolikowski, Chair, Alan Gorr, and Jerry Popp.
3. President Brown reported on the meeting of the Executive Committee.
4. Joe Burnett reported that the Philosophy of Education Society Proceedings would be in the mail by December 1, 1977, and that one issue of Studies remains to be published. Burnett also reported that Educational Theory was experiencing financial difficulties and is cutting back one-third. In spite of financial problems, he reported that the journal is being mailed to 63 foreign countries and is becoming an international publication.

New Business

1. President Brown requested that all MWPES members: (a) be encouraged to pay society dues regularly and (b) send names and addresses of prospective members for the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society to Secretary-Treasurer George Kizer (205B Curtiss Hall, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011).
2. Brown discussed the possibility of publishing yearly proceedings of the annual meeting, commenting that such a publication would provide a worthwhile service to all members of the Society whether or not they were in attendance at the yearly meeting.
3. Krolikowski reported that the Midwest History of Education Society publishes such a document for \$2.50, and volunteered to seek additional information relative to their experience.

*The Treasurer's report was read and approved.

4. Seeman commented on the difficulty of finding appropriate avenues for criticism of work, and expressed the opinion that the members of the Society need such an opportunity as the proceedings would afford.
5. Tesconi moved that the Executive Committee investigate possibilities of publishing proceedings. Motion passed, and the membership expressed strong approval of the idea.
6. Brown commented that if the Society were to move toward a publication venture, it might be well to maintain an adequate financial balance to support the venture. He moved, nevertheless, that the Society give a token amount of \$50.00 to the support of Educational Theory. Tankard seconded the motion.
7. Smith moved to amend Brown's motion to ask that the Society members be asked to contribute to a special collection in support of Educational Theory. Burnett seconded the motion to amend. Krolikowski moved to amend Brown's motion to raise the amount donated to Educational Theory to \$100.00. Motion carried.
8. Brown commented on the proposed annual meeting site for the 1978 annual meeting in Ann Arbor, raising the question of advisability of meeting earlier, e.g., in October. Discussion ensued, and the consensus of the group was to retain the present calendar location for the meeting.
9. Brown called for announcements and comments.
10. Meeting adjourned at 12:22.

Respectfully submitted,

George A. Kizer
Secretary-Treasurer

TREASURER'S REPORT, NOVEMBER 13, 1977
Midwest Philosophy of Education Society

Cash on hand, as of transfer of funds from previous Treasurer on Jan. 21, 1977	\$585.25
Dues received as of Nov. 10, 1977	83.00
Dividend accrued on funds deposited in savings account, Hawkeye Savings & Loan Association, Ames, Iowa	16.27
Dues and Registration fees collected at Convention, Nov. 11-12, 1977	206.00
Total funds to account for	\$890.52

Expenses:

Donation to <u>Educational Theory</u> . . .	\$150.00
Postage	57.05
Office Supplies & Stationery	44.47
Dues Refund (overpayment)	5.00
Bill from Milwaukee (Nov. 1976) Convention	5.00
Expenses, Chicago Convention, Nov. 11-12, 1977 (Downtown Holiday Inn)	267.50
	<u>\$529.02</u>
Balance, as of November 13, 1977	\$361.50 =====

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